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The Evidence of Things Not Seen:
Divining Balancing Factors from Kiobel’s
“Touch and Concern” Test
Ursula Tracy Doyle*
The long awaited Supreme Court decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum raised
the bar for human rights plaintiffs seeking redress under the Alien Tort Statute
(“ATS”), a statute which provides jurisdiction in U.S. district courts for foreign
nationals alleging a tort in violation of customary international law. Prior to Kiobel, the
typical ATS case alleged atrocities against corporate actors based upon events that
occurred largely, if not entirely, outside of the United States. In Kiobel, however, the
Supreme Court held that the presumption against extraterritoriality applied to the ATS
and that this presumption precludes claims brought pursuant to the statute unless they
“touch and concern” the United States sufficiently to overcome the presumption. The
Court, though, did not define “touch and concern,” implicitly inviting lower courts to
do so.
This Article suggests that courts determine that a claim touches and concerns the
United States pursuant to a multifactor balancing test drawn from inferences in the
Kiobel majority opinion, stated preferences in Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion, and
international jurisdictional norms more broadly. Despite Kiobel’s arrival, judges,
advocates, and litigants now await clarification on the meaning of its “touch and
concern” test. This Article endeavors to provide a cogent and practical interpretation.

* Assistant Professor of Law, Salmon P. Chase College of Law (Chase), Northern Kentucky
University; J.D., Indiana University-Bloomington School of Law; M.A., Columbia University; A.B.,
Cornell University. I thank Nancy Firak, Jon Garon, David Moore, Mark Stavsky, and the participants
in the Chase Faculty Workshop for their considered critique of an earlier draft of this paper. Any and
all errors herein are, of course, my own.
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Introduction
The second of the certified questions was straightforward:
“[W]hether and under what circumstances courts may recognize a cause
of action under the [Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”)], for violations of the
law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the
United States.”1 But, in answering that question in Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co.,2 the Supreme Court largely demurred, leaving the
teeming masses to wonder precisely “under what circumstances” the
ATS applies to extraterritorial harm.3 The ATS states, in toto, “[t]he

1. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1662 (2013).
2. There, several Nigerians sued Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., a Dutch corporation, Shell Transport
and Trading Company, P.L.C., a British corporation, and Shell Petroleum Development Company of
Nigeria, Ltd. (“SPDC”), a Nigerian corporation, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York, asserting jurisdiction under the ATS, for, allegedly, aiding and abetting the Nigerian
government in killing, raping, torturing, and otherwise abusing residents of Nigeria’s Ogoniland, a region
near the Niger Delta. Id. at 1662–63. The plaintiffs contended that the defendants’ actions were in
response to protests in that region against the SPDC for environmental degradation. Id. at 1662. The
plaintiffs further alleged that the defendants provided the government with the means to accomplish the
attacks, including compensation, transportation, and food. Id. at 1662–63. The district court dismissed
claims based upon allegations that did not seem to be customary international law violations but did not
dismiss all claims. Id. at 1663. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed
plaintiffs’ complaint in its entirety on the ground that corporations cannot be sued pursuant to the ATS.
Id. (citing Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010)).
3. Id. at 1663; Tymoshenko v. Firtash, No. 11-CV-2794 (KMW), 2013 WL 4564646, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2013) (noting that “the Court failed to provide guidance regarding what is
necessary to satisfy the ‘touch and concern’ standard”).
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district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States.”4 The public receives little guidance in
knowing that this statute only applies to foreign conduct if the claim that
emerges from the conduct “touch[es] and concern[s]”5 the United States
“with sufficient force to displace the presumption against
extraterritorial[ity],”6 as the Court opined in a coda.7 The Court did not
define this “touch and concern” test8 but implicitly invited lower courts
to do so.9 It did suggest, however, that if “relevant conduct”10 concerning
the claim brought pursuant to the ATS took place in the United States,
that conduct would satisfy the touch and concern test.11 The Court,
however, did not define relevant conduct.
This Article submits that courts should use a multifactor balancing
test to determine whether a claim touches and concerns the United
States. The proposed factors—drawn from inferences in the Kiobel
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2014). The ATS was enacted in 1789 as a part of the First Judiciary Act to
provide jurisdiction over the customary international law violations then recognized; for example,
“violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.” Kiobel, 133 S. Ct.
at 1666 (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004)); see Curtis A. Bradley, State Action
and Corporate Human Rights Liability, 85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1823, 1823–25 (2010).
5. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
6. Id. The presumption against extraterritoriality is a canon of statutory construction. Id. at 1664.
It means simply that if the relevant statute does not clearly speak to its extraterritorial application, “it
has none.” Id. (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010)). In Kiobel, the
Supreme Court observed that “[t]he presumption against extraterritoriality guards against our courts
triggering . . . serious foreign policy consequences, and instead defers such decisions, quite
appropriately, to the political branches.” Id. at 1669.
7. Id.
8. See id. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Other cases may arise with allegations of serious
violations of international law principles protecting persons, cases covered neither by the [Torture
Victim Protection Act (“TVPA”)] nor by the reasoning and holding of today’s case; and in those
disputes the proper implementation of the presumption against extraterritorial application may
require some further elaboration and explanation.” (emphasis added)); id. (Alito, J., concurring)
(“This formulation obviously leaves much unanswered . . . .”); id. at 1673 (Breyer, J., concurring) (The
Court “leaves for another day the determination of just when the presumption against
extraterritoriality might be ‘overcome.’” (quoting id. at 1666)); Sarah H. Cleveland, The Kiobel
Presumption and Extraterritoriality, 52 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 8, 20 (2013) (“Returning now to that
final paragraph of the majority opinion, we again ask what that test requires.”); David H. Moore,
Kiobel and the New Battle Over Congressional Intent, in Agora: Reflections on Kiobel e-9, e-10
(Am. Soc’y of Int’l Law ed., 2014) (“It will take time to flesh out what it means to ‘touch and concern
the territory of the United States . . . with sufficient force.’”); Ralph G. Steinhardt, Kiobel and the
Weakening of Precedent: A Long Walk for a Short Drink, 107 Am. J. Int’l L. 841, 842 (2013) (stating
Kiobel “gives precious little guidance to the lower courts as they struggle to determine which
allegations will overcome the new presumption and which will not”).
9. One commentator has observed that this uncertainty “will likely result in far fewer [ATS]
cases being pursued in U.S. federal courts.” Andrew Sanger, Corporations and Transnational
Litigation: Comparing Kiobel with the Jurisprudence of English Courts, in Agora: Reflections on
Kiobel, supra note 8, at e-23, e-24.
10. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
11. Id.
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majority opinion, suggestions from Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion
that expressly contemplate international jurisdictional norms, and
international jurisdictional norms more broadly—are:
1. the location of the alleged law of nations violation;
2. the location of other alleged relevant conduct;
3. the nationality of the defendant;
4. the demands of international comity;
5. the likelihood that denial of subject matter jurisdiction could
reasonably result in the United States harboring a human rights
violator; and
6. any other American national interest that supports the
recognition of ATS subject matter jurisdiction.

This Article seeks to provide a cogent and practical test to determine
when the ATS applies to extraterritorial conduct.
The ATS is, at least operatively, a human rights statute.12 Whether
one deems its proper application domestic, extraterritorial, or both, it is
undeniable that, at its drafting, Congress had “‘foreign matters’ in
mind.”13 Those matters concerned, in part, violations of customary
international law, that body of law recognized today as a source for
international human rights standards.14 Congress has at no time acted to
limit or annul the statute.15 While, in Kiobel, the Court delimited the
activity that the statute reaches, it did nothing to alter the extant
understanding of the statute’s purpose: “to provide compensation for
those injured by today’s pirates.”16 What remains is the only statute of its
kind in the country (and, indeed, the world) because it has the potential
to provide an “alien” with a civil remedy from a U.S. court based upon a
variety of customary international law violations committed by a foreign

12. See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822, 843 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (observing that the ATS
is a “statute that provides jurisdiction in United States courts for violations of international human rights
norms that are specific, universal, and obligatory”) (citation omitted); see also Balintulo v. Daimler AG,
727 F.3d 174, 179 (2d Cir. 2013) (noting that the ATS is “a statute, passed in 1789, that was rediscovered
and revitalized by the courts in recent decades to permit aliens to sue for alleged serious violations of
human rights occurring abroad”); Ingrid Wuerth, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.: The Supreme
Court and the Alien Tort Statute, 107 Am. J. Int’l L. 601, 601 (2013) (noting that “the ATS . . . has
become the main engine for transnational human rights litigation in the United States”).
13. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1672 (Breyer, J., concurring). It seems unquestionable that this is the case
given the impulse behind Congress’s enactment of the statute—concern about providing legal redress
to foreigners harmed in the United States and concomitant concern about foreign policy implications
in the event of congressional inaction. See id. at 1666.
14. See William S. Dodge, Customary International Law and the Question of Legitimacy,
120 Harv. L. Rev. F. 19, 22 (2007) (recognizing that over time “new rules of customary international
law emerged in areas like human rights”).
15. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1677 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Congress . . . has not sought to limit the
statute’s jurisdictional or substantive reach.”).
16. Id. at 1673 (stating that the ATS’s “basic purpose” is to “compensat[e] those who have
suffered harm at the hands of, for example, torturers or other modern pirates”).
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national and occurring in the territory of a sovereign other than the
United States.17
This Article proposes that courts give full force to the statute’s
terms as permitted by Kiobel, and not reactively assume even that a
“foreign-cubed” case (a case with solely foreign plaintiffs and defendants
and injury in a foreign country) cannot itself have sufficient U.S. features
to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality.18 Such an
approach would be consistent with international jurisdictional norms,
which Justice Breyer, at least, professed a desire to uphold. International
jurisdictional norms recognize the propriety of courts exercising
prescriptive jurisdiction,19 subject to reasonableness,20 in a variety of
17. Pierre N. Leval, The Long Arm of International Law, Foreign Aff., Mar.–Apr. 2013, at 16, 16
(“The ATS offers victims of abuse a rare tool in their fight for justice; the United States remains the
only country in the world to entertain such lawsuits.”); see also Caroline Kaeb & David Scheffer, The
Paradox of Kiobel in Europe, 107 Am. J. Int’l L. 852, 854–55 (2013) (discussing the similarities and
differences between the ATS and relevant European law, including the Brussels I Regulation, which
allows for the bringing of a tort suit by a non-national against European Union (“EU”) companies,
provided that the events that gave rise to the tort occurred on EU soil). While somewhat similar to the
ATS, the TVPA, the companion statute to the ATS, provides a cause of action for an individual
against an individual acting “under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign
nation,” only for extrajudicial killing and torture. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2014). The ATS has broader
application. See infra pp. 478–79. The claim brought pursuant to the ATS, however, must satisfy Sosa’s
requirement that the relevant customary international law be specific and universally respected. Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725, 732 (2004).
18. See Jonathan Hafetz, Human Rights Litigation and the National Interest: Kiobel’s
Application of the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality to the Alien Tort Statute, 28 Md. J. Int’l
L. 107, 108 (2013) (“ATS litigation can promote U.S. interests even in ‘foreign-cubed cases,’ where
both parties are foreign nationals and the alleged wrongful conduct takes place abroad.”); David L.
Sloss, Kiobel and Extraterritoriality: A Rule Without a Rationale, 28 Md. J. Int’l L. 241, 244 (2013)
(“[T]he universality principle authorizes states to exercise jurisdiction extraterritorially in cases like
Kiobel. Therefore, insofar as the Supreme Court wants to preclude application of the ATS to foreigncubed cases, it cannot legitimately invoke an international law rationale to justify that outcome.”); see
also Ralph G. Steinhardt, Kiobel and the Multiple Futures of Corporate Liability for Human Rights
Violations, 28 Md. J. Int’l L. 1, 23 (2013) (“Foreign-cubed cases against corporations that fit the
Kiobel mold are barred, but the Court’s analysis . . . suggest[s] that foreign-cubed actions against
individual human beings—as in Filártiga [v. Pena-Irala] and [In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights
Litigation]—survive. . . . [T]hey are after all safe haven cases, in which the defendant commits abuses
abroad and then comes to the United States and remains.”). But see Vivian Grosswald Curran &
David Sloss, Reviving Human Rights Litigation After Kiobel, 107 Am. J. Int’l L. 858, 858 (2013)
(“[T]he Court’s decision apparently sounds the death knell for ‘foreign-cubed’ human rights claims
under the ATS—that is, cases in which foreign defendants committed human rights abuses against
foreign plaintiffs in foreign countries.”); Justine Nolan et al., Beyond Kiobel: Alternative Remedies
for Sustained Human Rights Protection, in Agora: Reflections on Kiobel, supra note 8, at e-48, e-49
(“Absent affirmative support by the U.S. government, or a clearer expression of legislative intent by
the U.S. Congress, most U.S. courts are likely to be reluctant to provide a judicial remedy in foreigncubed cases.”); John F. Savarese & George T. Conway III, The Impact of Kiobel Curtailing the
Extraterritorial Scope of the Alien Tort Statute, Wall St. Law., July 2013, at 3 (“In its recent decision
in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., . . . the Supreme Court put an abrupt and categorical end to
foreign-cubed ATS litigation . . . .”).
19. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 402 (1987).
20. Id. § 403.
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circumstances, including when: conduct occurs in a State’s territory,21
“the status of persons, or interests in things” in a State’s territory are at
issue,22 conduct occurs outside a State’s territory and “has or is intended
to have substantial effect within [the State’s] territory,”23 matters
concerning a State’s nationals (both outside and inside the State’s
territory) are at issue,24 and conduct occurs outside the State’s territory
by a foreign national but “is directed against the security of the [S]tate or
against a limited class of other [S]tate interests.”25
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Kiobel plaintiffs to
answer, at least initially, the single question of corporate liability under
the ATS.26 That the Court decided not to expressly answer the question
when it granted certiorari to do precisely that,27 but implied the existence
of corporate liability, suggests that the Court tacitly provided its
answer.28 This, of course, is good news for those concerned about
allegations of corporate human rights abuses across the globe and who
look to the ATS as a means to sue corporate tortfeasors. Given the
Court’s implicit recognition of corporate liability under the ATS (or at
least its choice not to state that there is no such liability), this Article
assumes that such liability exists and bases its arguments on corporate (as
opposed to individual) conduct.29
21. Id. § 402(1)(a).
22. Id. § 402(1)(b).
23. Id. § 402(1)(c).
24. Id. § 402(2).
25. Id. § 402(3).
26. After oral argument on this question, the Supreme Court took the unusual step of ordering
additional briefing and reargument by the parties on the issue of the extraterritorial application of the
ATS. The Court ultimately rendered its decision solely on this latter question. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1663 (2013).
27. Tymoshenko v. Firtash, No. 11-CV-2794 (KMW), 2013 WL 4564646, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28,
2013) (noting that “the majority opinion did not address the issue of corporate liability under the
ATS”) (citation omitted).
28. The Court suggested that some corporate behavior or status is sufficient to rebut the
presumption against extraterritorial application of the ATS. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (opining that
“[c]orporations are often present in many countries, and it would reach too far to say that mere
corporate presence suffices”) (emphasis added); see Doe v. Nestle, 738 F.3d 1048, 1049 (9th Cir. 2013)
(finding, post-Kiobel, that “corporations can face liability for claims brought under the Alien Tort
Statute”); Steinhardt, supra note 8, at 844 (noting that the Court’s silence on the issue of corporate
liability, after extensive briefing on the subject, suggests that “Kiobel offers no authority for any broad
rethinking of ATS litigation against corporate defendants in general”; and recognizing that “the
majority’s specification that ‘mere corporate presence is not enough’ would be superfluous if
corporations were, in principle, immune from ATS liability”); Wuerth, supra note 12, at 609
(observing that “[t]he Court did not directly address the question on which it originally granted
certiorari—corporate liability under the ATS—but the opinions arguably assume the validity of ATS
suits against corporations”); see also Anupam Chander, Unshackling Foreign Corporations: Kiobel’s
Unexpected Legacy, 107 Am. J. Int’l L. 829, 829 (assuming the application of the ATS, post-Kiobel, to
American corporations and far less so foreign corporations, and finding that “American corporations
are simply far more likely to satisfy [the “touch and concern” test] than foreign corporations”).
29. This Author believes, however, that the proposed test applies equally to individuals.
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It is important to see Kiobel, especially inclusive of the corporate
liability question, against the backdrop of events that are happening in
the business and human rights communities globally. In 2005, U.N.
Secretary General Kofi Annan tapped Harvard Law Professor John
Ruggie to research the relationship between business and human rights
abuse.30 Pursuant to his appointment as Special Representative of the
Secretary General on Human Rights and Transnational Corporations
and Other Business Enterprises, Professor Ruggie issued the Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United
Nations’ “Respect, Protect and Remedy Framework” (Guiding
Principles).31 Those principles, presented within three “pillars,” speak to
the responsibilities of states and corporations. The pillars are: (1) The
State Duty to Protect Human Rights; (2) The Corporate Responsibility
to Respect Human Rights; and (3) Access to Remedy.32 The Guiding
Principles have received widespread commendation and acceptance by
stakeholders, including national governments, civil society, and
businesses themselves.33 It is the third pillar—Access to Remedy—that
the ATS, even after Kiobel, has the capacity to vindicate.34

30. See Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General Appoints John Ruggie of United
States Special Representative on Issue of Human Rights, Transnational Corporations, Other Business
Enterprises, U.N. Press Release SG/A/934 (July 28, 2005). Additionally, in 2011, the United Nations
Human Rights Council created an entity entitled the Working Group on the Issue of Human Rights
and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises (Working Group). See Human
Rights Council Res. 17/4, Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises, 17th Sess., July 6, 2011, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/17/4 (July 6, 2011). The Working Group
consists of five international human rights experts and is charged with, among other tasks, ensuring the
widespread distribution and implementation of the Guiding Principles. Working Group on the Issues
of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, U.N. Hum. Rts.,
Office of the High Commissioner for Hum. Rts., http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/
Pages/WGHRandtransnationalcorporationsandotherbusiness.aspx (last visited Feb. 2, 2015).
31. See generally Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights
and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (by John Ruggie) (presenting and discussing all thirty-one principles).
For further reading, see John Gerard Ruggie, Just Business: Multinational Corporations and
Human Rights (2013) and Jena Martin Amerson, “The End of the Beginning?”: A Comprehensive
Look at the U.N.’s Business and Human Rights Agenda from a Bystander Perspective, 17 Fordham J.
Corp. & Fin. L. 871 (2012).
32. U.N. Human Rights Council, Office of the High Comm’r, Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, iii,
U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/11/04 (2011).
33. The interest in the Guiding Principles is so substantial that at the second U.N. Forum on
Business and Human Rights in Geneva, Switzerland, in December 2013, there were approximately
1,500 participants from over 100 countries, and all societal sectors—government, civil society, and
business. See 2013 United Nations Forum on Business and Human Rights, U.N. Hum. Rts. Council,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Forum/Pages/2013ForumonBusinessandHumanRights.aspx
(last visited Feb. 2, 2015); see also State National Action Plans, U.N. Hum. Rts. Council,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/NationalActionPlans.aspx (last visited Feb. 2, 2015)
(providing links to several “State National Action Plans” related to business and human rights). Many
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Professor Ruggie also issued survey results on “the scope and
patterns of alleged . . . human rights abuses.”35 These results are key,
given the difficulty in approximating the extent and nature of the
perceived problem of corporate human rights abuse.36 In his report, he
stakeholders have also accepted “The Ten Principles,” regarding business and human rights, promulgated
by the U.N. Global Compact, an organization supported by the U.N. General Assembly. See General
Assembly Resolutions, U.N. Global Compact, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/
Government_Support/general_assembly_resolutions.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2015); The Ten Principles,
U.N. Global Compact, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html (last
visited Feb. 2, 2015).
34. Some commentators, however, find the practical application of the Guiding Principles
unclear. See Nolan, supra note 18, at e-50 (“While the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights both affirm that companies have a responsibility to respect rights and call on
governments and companies to develop meaningful remedies when rights are violated, a lack of clarity
or consensus still exists about what these concepts mean in practice.”).
35. See Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Corporations and Human Rights: A Survey
of the Scope and Patterns of Alleged Corporate-Related Human Rights Abuse at 1, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/8/5/Add.2 (May 23, 2008) (addendum to Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the
Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Promotion and

Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the
Right to Development, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008)) [hereinafter Ruggie Addendum].
36. The problem of corporate human rights abuses, however, is thought to be so great that,
beyond the work of the U.N., governmental, nongovernmental, and commercial entities have devoted
energy, resources, and imagination to its understanding and prevention. For example, the U.S.
government has instituted new corporate reporting requirements to address concerns about the
impacts that businesses have on human rights. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act required the Securities and Exchange Commission to issue a rule mandating that
companies whose products require the use of certain minerals in their manufacture—including
tantalum, tin, gold, and tungsten—publicly disclose whether they procured these minerals from the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”) or one of several adjoining countries. See Dodd-Frank
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1502, 124 Stat. 1376, 2213–2218 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C. (2014)). Ostensibly, the purpose of the rule is to prevent the
funding of armed conflict and/or human rights abuses in the DRC and adjoining countries by limiting
the purchase of minerals from entities that might use the payments to fund conflict and/or human
rights atrocities. The thought seems to be that by shining a light on the procurement of these so-called
“conflict minerals,” companies will purchase fewer of them. See 156 Cong. Rec. S3817 (daily ed.
May 17, 2010) (statement of Sen. Chris Dodd). But see Marcia Narine, From Kansas to the Congo:

Why Naming and Shaming Corporations Through the Dodd-Frank Act’s Corporate Governance
Disclosure Won’t Solve a Human Rights Crisis, 25 Regent U. L. Rev. 351 (2013) (discussing possible
unintended consequences of the conflict minerals rule). The rule went into effect on January 1, 2013,
and companies were set to issue the first of such reports on May 31, 2014. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 249b
(2014). There are also countless nongovernmental organizations devoted to the issue of business and
human rights. See, e.g., Business and Human Rights, Amnesty Int’l, http://www.amnesty.org/en/
business-and-human-rights (last visited Feb. 2, 2015); Business and Human Rights, Hum. Rts. Watch,
http://www.hrw.org/topic/business (last visited Feb. 2, 2015); Demand Corporate Accountability, Amazon
Watch, http://amazonwatch.org/work/corporate-accountability (last visited Feb. 2, 2015); Current Cases,
Ctr. for Const. Rts., http://ccrjustice.org/current-cases (last visited Feb. 2, 2015); Cases, Ctr. for Just. &
Accountability, http://cja.org/article.php?list=type&type=5 (last visited Feb. 2, 2015); Corporate
Accountability, EarthRights Int’l, http://www.earthrights.org/legal/corporate-accountability (last
visited Feb. 2, 2015); Our Work, Int’l Lab. Rts. F., http://www.laborrights.org/our-work (last visited
Feb. 2, 2015); What We Do, Int’l Rts. Advocs., http://www.iradvocates.org/what-we-do (last visited
Feb. 2, 2015); Challenging Corporations, Rainforest Action Network, http://ran.org/challenging-
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reviewed 320 cases (reported over a roughly three-year period) of
alleged corporate human rights abuses and noted that these allegations
emerged from “all industry sectors” and spanned the globe.37 According
to his review, these cases “connected alleged abuses to over 250 firms,
ranging from small suppliers to Fortune Global 500 companies, to Stateowned enterprises and their subsidiaries.”38 Professor Ruggie observed
that corporations were alleged to be “directly” responsible for
approximately sixty percent of the human rights abuses39—meaning that
the corporation’s “own actions or omissions were alleged to cause the
abuse”40 with “no degree or a very minimal degree of separation
between company actions and alleged abuses.”41 Additionally, he
observed that corporations were alleged to be “indirectly”42 responsible for
approximately forty percent of the abuses,43 meaning that the
corporation “contribute[d] to or benefit[ted] from the abuses of third
parties.”44 Professor Ruggie noted that this indirect involvement can take
multiple forms, including “[s]tate clearing of land for corporate use that
corporations (last visited Feb. 2, 2015). Further, numerous multinational corporations have themselves
instituted corporate social responsibility programs to prevent human rights abuses. These programs take
many forms, including but not limited to, creating codes of conduct with a specific focus on human rights,
providing employee human rights awareness training, undertaking social impact assessments, and creating
supplier guidelines. See Shell Code of Conduct, Shell Global, http://www.shell.com/global/aboutshell/whowe-are/our-values/code-of-conduct.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2015); Respecting Human Rights, ExxonMobil,
http://www.exxonmobil.com/Corporate/community_rights_respect.aspx (last visited Feb. 2, 2015); Social
Impact Assessments, Occidental Petroleum Corp., http://www.oxy.com/sr/HumanRights/Pages/
SocialImpactAssessments.aspx (last visited Feb. 2, 2015); Supplier Guiding Principles, Coca-Cola Co.,
http://www.coca-colacompany.com/our-company/supplier-guiding-principles (last visited Feb. 2, 2015);
Guidelines, Daimler AG, http://www.daimler.com/company/corporate-governance/guidelines (last visited
Feb. 2, 2015); Good Business, Hershey Co., http://www.thehersheycompany.com/social-responsibility/
sharedgoodness/goodbusiness (last visited Feb. 2, 2015); see also Company Policy Statements on Human
Rights, Bus. & Hum. Rts. Res. Ctr., http://business-humanrights.org/en/company-policy-statements-onhuman-rights (last visited Feb. 2, 2015) (providing links to hundreds of corporate policy statements that
expressly mention “human rights”).
37. Ruggie Addendum, supra note 35, at 2, 9 (including industry sectors such as, “extractive;
financial services; food and beverage; heavy manufacturing, infrastructure and utilities; information
technology, electronics and telecommunications; pharmaceutical and chemical; retail and consumer
products; and a residual category (other)”). To determine the rights to be protected, Professor Ruggie
stated that he consulted the following conventions: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, and the International Labor Organization Conventions. Id. at 2.
38. Id. at 9.
39. Id. at 4.
40. Id. at 11.
41. Id.
42. Most ATS cases concern indirect corporate involvement in human rights abuses. See
Chimene I. Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60 Hastings L.J. 61, 63 (2008)
(“The problem of accomplice liability most often arises in ATS cases brought against corporations for
their alleged complicity in international law violations perpetrated by foreign governments, because
corporations rarely engage in conduct such as torture, rape, and summary execution directly.”).
43. Ruggie Addendum, supra note 35, at 4.
44. Id.
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violates indigenous rights in the process,”45 “corporate finance of
projects with records of abuse,”46 and purchasing supplies from a human
rights abuser.47
The review divided the allegations into instances where labor rights
were impacted and those where nonlabor rights were impacted.48 Of the
former, the allegations included the failure to respect the “abolition of
slavery and forced labor” and the “abolition of child labor.”49 Of the
latter, the allegations included the failure to respect the “right to life,
liberty and the security of the person” and “freedom from torture or
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.”50 The vast majority of these
allegations concerned events that occurred outside of the United States.51
These allegations are the “stuff” of ATS claims. Indeed, plaintiffs
likely began to avail themselves of the ATS in the 1990s, rather than
using perhaps the more obvious alternative, state tort law, because: (1)
they could secure subject matter jurisdiction for “foreign-cubed” cases;52
(2) before Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,53 and to some degree after, they
could use the ATS to provide both subject matter jurisdiction and a
cause of action;54 (3) they could benefit from the statute’s perceived ten-

45. Id. at 11.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 12–13.
49. Id. at 2.
50. Id. at 3.
51. Id. at 9–10; see also Keitner, supra note 42, at 74 n.57 (“[T]he vast majority of ATS cases
involve conduct that took place overseas.”).
52. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (making no issue of the foreigncubedness of the ATS claim, which involved Mexican parties and an alleged tort that occurred in
Mexico); In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding ATS
jurisdiction where the parties were Philippines citizens and the alleged tort occurred in that country);
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding ATS jurisdiction where the parties were
Paraguayan citizens and the alleged tort occurred in that country).
53. The significance of Sosa is manifold: (1) it clarified that the ATS is solely a jurisdictional
statute and does not provide a cause of action, Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712–13, 724; (2) at the same time, it
acknowledged that the causes of action that the ATS should recognize are judge-made, for example,
federal common law, id. at 724, 729; (3) it stated that this federal common law must derive from
customary international law, id. at 729–30; and (4) it provided a framework for courts to use when
determining the customary international law that they should recognize at common law, id. at 731–32.
To wit, as noted above, it states that courts should recognize customary international law that is
specific and universally respected. Id. at 725, 732.
54. See Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1262 (11th Cir. 2009) (“In Sosa, the Supreme
Court confirmed the ATS is not only a jurisdictional statute; the ATS also empowers federal courts to
entertain ‘a very limited category’ of claims” (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712) (citing Aldana v. Del
Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1246 (11th Cir. 2005))), abrogated on other grounds
by Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, 132 S. Ct. 1702 (2012); Anton Metlitsky, The Alien Tort
Statute, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of Federal-Common-Law Causes of Action, 52 Colum.
J. Transnat’l L. 53, 54 (2013) (“[T]he lower courts generally held the view that the ATS provided
private plaintiffs a right of action to enforce certain norms of international law that were incorporated
into federal common law.”).
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year limitation period;55 and (4) they could take advantage of the social
pressure against the defendant attendant with a claim of a human rights
violation.56 While today, post-Kiobel, it is clear that the ATS is
unavailable for a foreign-cubed case unless the claim touches and
concerns the United States and does not provide a cause of action,57 the
statute remains a potentially useful tool for plaintiffs because of the
assumed lengthy statute of limitations and the social pressure applied to
an ATS defendant. Additionally, the alternative to seeking jurisdiction
under the statute—state common law—carries with it inherent
obstacles.58 Were plaintiffs forced to forsake ATS claims59 for state

55. See Jean v. Dorelien, 431 F.3d 776, 778 (11th Cir. 2005) (concluding that “[u]nder the TVPA
and the ATCA, Plaintiffs have ten years from the date the cause of action arose to bring suit for
torture, extrajudicial killing and other torts committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of
the United States” (citations omitted)); Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, No. 06-cv-3869, 2009 WL 4663865,
at *3 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2009) (citing Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1012 (9th Cir. 2002))
(concluding that the statute of limitations for the ATS is ten years); Arce v. Garcia, 400 F.3d 1340,
1345–46 (11th Cir. 2005) (same); Javier H. v. Garcia-Botello, 239 F.R.D. 342, 346 (W.D.N.Y. 2006)
(same); Doe v. Islamic Salvation Front, 257 F. Supp. 2d 115, 118–19 (D.D.C. 2003) (same); Manliguez
v. Joseph, 226 F. Supp. 2d 377, 386 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (same).
56. See Donald Earl Childress III, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and the Next Wave of
Transnational Litigation, 100 Geo. L.J. 709, 725 (2012) (“[I]t seems that the real value of an ATS case
is that it transforms a tort case into a human-rights case.”); Leval, supra note 17, at 16 (“At the very
least, keeping courts open to civil suits about human rights can bring solace and compensation to
victims. More important, these suits draw global attention to atrocities, and in so doing perhaps deter
would-be abusers.”); Robert McCorquodale, Waving Not Drowning: Kiobel Outside the United
States, 107 Am. J. Int’l L. 846, 850–51 (2013) (recognizing that many cases outside the United States
do not style human rights abuse claims as such, but rather as a claim of negligence or breach of
contract and that this change in nomenclature “diminishes the potential significance of the clear
statement in the Guiding Principles that corporations (and not just states) may be liable for violating
human rights”).
57. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013) (noting that “all the
relevant conduct took place outside the United States” but also that the presumption against the
extraterritorial application of the ATS can be displaced if the ATS claim touches and concerns the
United States “with sufficient force to displace the presumption”). Id. at 1663 (“The statute provides
district courts with jurisdiction to hear certain claims, but does not expressly provide any causes of action.”).
58. It is true, though, that if plaintiffs bring their claims under state law, they will not be burdened
with: (1) whether a corporation can be sued under the statute; (2) whether the facts of the case
sufficiently touch and concern the United States as to displace the presumption against
extraterritoriality; (3) whether the alleged tort violates the law of nations; or (4) whether the alleged
law of nations violation satisfies Sosa. Professor Hoffman is surely correct when he writes that “it is
clear that any further narrowing of the extraterritorial scope of the ATS after Kiobel will shift
litigation to state courts or to federal courts based on diversity or other bases of federal subject matter
jurisdiction.” Paul L. Hoffman, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.: First Impressions, 52 Colum. J.
Transnat’l L. 28, 51 (2013). Dean Austen Parrish, however, observes the “folly” of filing would-be
ATS actions in state court. See Austen L. Parrish, Kiobel, Unilateralism and the Retreat from
Extraterritoriality, 28 Md. J. Int’l L. 208, 240 (2013) (“[E]mploying a state law strategy is unlikely to
meaningfully advance human rights. These cases face tremendous hurdles to success. While the
presumption against extraterritoriality may not apply, courts will rightly be reluctant to adjudicate
foreign claims for abuses occurring abroad to which the state has no interest.”).
59. See Peter Henner, When Is a Corporation a Person? When It Wants To Be. Will Kiobel End
Alien Tort Statute Litigation?, 12 Wyo. L. Rev. 303, 304 (2012) (“The claims in Kiobel are typical of
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common law claims,60 they would likely lose the liberal ten-year statute
of limitation (most probably for something far shorter61) and any benefit
they might have accrued as a result of framing their claim as a human
rights violation. Plaintiffs might also subject themselves to powerful
preemption arguments62 and compelling forum non conveniens motions.63
Given these concerns and the allegations that plaintiffs typically present,64
it is important to elucidate the continued vitality of the ATS. This Article
endeavors to do that by divining balancing factors from Kiobel’s touch
and concern test.65
Part I analyzes several decisions rendered post-Kiobel, focusing on
the way that the courts interpreted, if at all, the Supreme Court’s touch
and concern language. Part II suggests a multifactor balancing test
derived from intimations in the Kiobel majority opinion; stated preferences
by Justice Breyer in his concurring opinion, premised, in part, on
international jurisdictional norms; and international jurisdictional norms
broadly, to determine when a defendant’s conduct has touched and
concerned the United States with sufficient force to displace the
presumption against extraterritoriality. Part III demonstrates how the
proposed test interacts with Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Ltd.,
in which the Supreme Court opined that the presumption against

many ATS cases where plaintiffs allege that a multinational corporation, operating in a country
outside of the United States, has aided and abetted a repressive government in brutally suppressing
opposition to government policy.”); David He, Note, Beyond Securities Fraud: The Territorial Reach
of U.S. Laws After Morrison v. N.A.B., 2013 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 148, 190–91 (2013) (citations
omitted) (“The typical ATS claims brought against individuals often involve instances of torture,
arbitrary and prolonged arrests, murders and executions, and genocide and other crimes against
humanity.”).
60. Svetlana Meyerzon Nagiel, Note, An Overlooked Gateway to Victim Compensation: How
States Can Provide a Forum for Human Rights Claims, 46 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 133, 155–59 (2007)
(observing that some plaintiffs bring human rights claims pursuant to state statute and the state
common law, including breach of contract, negligence, negligence per se, aiding and abetting and
vicarious liability).
61. See 50 State Statutory Surveys: Civil Laws: Civil Procedure: Civil Statutes of
Limitation, 0020 Surveys 1 (West 2007).
62. See Childress, supra note 56, at 749–50.
63. See generally Donald Earl Childress III, Forum Conveniens: The Search for a Convenient
Forum in Transnational Cases, 53 Va. J. Int’l L. 157 (2012).
64. See He, supra note 59, at 190–91.
65. Indeed, such a test might make ATS litigation more fruitful for plaintiffs than it has been to
date, as it would provide the beginnings of a framework for litigating the cases. See Moore, supra note
8, at e-18 (noting that “[h]uman rights litigation under the ATS has been largely symbolic and has
rarely led to liability”); Beth Stephens, Upsetting Checks and Balances: The Bush Administration’s
Efforts to Limit Human Rights Litigation, 17 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 169, 175 (2004) (observing that many
ATS cases have failed pursuant to sovereign immunity, political question, and statute of limitation and
sufficiency of claim challenges); Samuel Moyn, Why the Court Was Right About the Alien Tort
Statute, Foreign Aff. (May 2, 2013), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139359/samuel-moyn/whythe-court-was-right-about-the-alien-tort-statute (recognizing that “[t]he ATS never proved that useful
in advancing the cause of global human rights”).
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extraterritoriality applies to federal statutes unless the statute clearly
indicates otherwise and that those statutes only contemplate the conduct
or the relationship that is the focus of the statute and not ancillary
activity.66 The Article concludes by underscoring the opportunity created
by Kiobel to craft a balancing test that brings clarity to the kinds of
claims that the ATS can reach.

I. Post-KIOBEL Cases
At this writing, a few dozen federal courts have spoken
substantively to the extraterritorial reach of the ATS since Kiobel.67
These courts fall roughly into one of the following camps: those that read
Kiobel to require that the law of nations violation occur in the United
States in order to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality
(These courts view the law of nations violation as the direct—and,
indeed, ultimate—injury and do not hold that a predicate act giving rise
to the direct injury could itself constitute a law of nations violation.);
those that read the case to require that only relevant conduct (as
distinguished from the law of nations violation) occur in the United
States in order to displace the presumption; those that read the case to
allow U.S. citizenship (or residency) to displace the presumption; those
that read the case to disallow U.S. citizenship to displace the

66. See generally Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
67. See, e.g., Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc. (Al Shimari II), 758 F.3d 516 (4th Cir.
2014); Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2014); Chowdhury v. Worldtel
Bangl. Holding, Ltd., 746 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2014); Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2013);
Muntslag v. D’ieteren, S.A., No. 12-cv-07038 (TPG), 2013 WL 2150686 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2013); Mwani
v. Laden, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013); Ahmed-Al-Khalifa v. Salvation Army, No. 13-cv-289-WS,
2013 WL 2432947 (N.D. Fla. June 3, 2013); Fotso v. Rep. of Cameroon, No. 12CV1415-TC, 2013 WL
3006338 (D. Ore. June 11, 2013); Mwangi v. Bush, No. 12-373-KKC, 2013 WL 3155018 (E.D. Ky.
June 18, 2013); Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc. (Al Shimari I), 951 F. Supp. 2d 857 (E.D. Va. 2013);
Mohammadi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 947 F. Supp. 2d 48 (D.D.C. 2013); Ahmed-Al-Khalifa v.
Obama, No. 13-cv-49-MW/GRJ, 2013 WL 3797287 (N.D. Fla. July 19, 2013); Giraldo v. Drummond
Co., No. 09-CV-1041-RDP, 2013 WL 3873960 (N.D. Ala. July 25, 2013); Hua Chen v. Honghui Shi,
No. 09Civ8920(RJS), 2013 WL 3963735 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2013); Ahmed-Al-Khalifa v. Fed. Republic
of Nigeria, No. 13-cv-172-RS-GRJ, 2013 WL 3991961 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2013); Ahmed v. Comm’r for
Educ. Lagos State, No. 13-cv-00050-MP-GRJ, 2013 WL 4001194 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 6, 2013); Ahmed-AlKhalifa v. Al-Assad, No. 13-cv-48-RV-GRJ, 2013 WL 4401831 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 2013); Sexual
Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304 (D. Mass. 2013); Ahmed v. Magan, No. 10-cv-00342,
2013 WL 4479077 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 20, 2013); Kaplan v. Cent. Bank of Islamic Republic of Iran, 961 F.
Supp. 2d 185 (D.D.C. 2013); Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners, No. 09-cv-1237, 2013 WL 4511354 (S.D.
Tex. Aug. 23, 2013); Muntslag v. Beerens, No. 12-cv-07168(TPG), 2013 WL 4519669 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26,
2013); Tymoshenko v. Firtash, No. 11-CV-2794(KMW), 2013 WL 4564646 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2013);
Chen Gang v. Zhao Zhizhen, No. 04CV1146RNC, 2013 WL 5313411 (D. Conn. Sept. 20, 2013); Dacer
v. Estrada, No. C 10-04165 WHA, 2013 WL 5978101 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2013); In re S. Afr. Apartheid
Litig., Nos. 02MDL1499(SAS), 02Civ4712(SAS), Civ6218(SAS), Civ1024(SAS), 03Civ4524(SAS), 2013
WL 6813877 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2013).
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presumption; and those that read the case to acknowledge that only
Congress can displace a statute’s presumption against extraterritoriality.
The disparate conclusions of these courts show the need for a
coherent test to determine when the presumption against the
extraterritorial application of a statute should be displaced. Indeed, the
district court in Al Shimari v. CACI International, Inc. (Al Shimari I)
opined that “it is unclear to the Court how to apply the ‘touch and
concern’ inquiry to a purely jurisdictional statute such as the ATS.”68
Below is a discussion of a few post-Kiobel cases that are remarkable for
their interpretation, or lack thereof, of the touch and concern test.
As of this writing, three circuit courts have interpreted Kiobel
through considered written opinions69—the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit,70 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,71
and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.72 In three of the
four cases decided, the courts dismissed the ATS claims on the ground
that no relevant conduct occurred in the United States. This Article
begins with a discussion of Cardona v. Chiquita Brands International,
Inc., which jars in its failure to respond, even in small part, to the
Supreme Court’s implied call for courts to consider whether a plaintiff’s
ATS allegations touch and concern the United States.
In Cardona, the plaintiffs alleged that Chiquita, a U.S.-based banana
producer, funded Colombian terrorists who violated the law of nations.73
They further alleged that “Chiquita participated in a campaign of torture
and murder in Colombia by reviewing, approving, and concealing a
scheme of payments and weapons shipments to Colombian terrorist
organizations, all from their corporate offices in the territory of the
United States.”74
Without attempting to define “relevant conduct,” opine on the
contours of the “touch and concern” test, or even discuss the plaintiffs’
allegations of Chiquita’s domestic conduct, the court dismissed the case,
stating: “All the relevant conduct in our case took place outside the

68. Al Shimari I, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 867 (emphasis added). By this, the court seemed to make two
valid points: (1) there is no extant touch and concern test; and (2) to apply such a test, which
necessarily speaks to the merits of a plaintiff’s claim, seems awkward, if not inappropriate, for a
jurisdictional analysis.
69. In light of Kiobel, an en banc U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit summarily affirmed
the dismissal of Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, a case brought by former and current residents of Papua New
Guinea against a British corporation, for crimes against humanity, amongst other atrocities, all
occurring in Papua New Guinea. 722 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2013).
70. Balintulo, 727 F.3d 174; Chowdhury, 746 F.3d 42.
71. Al Shimari II, 758 F.3d 516.
72. Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2014).
73. Id. at 1192 (Martin, J., dissenting).
74. Id.
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United States.”75 The court seemed to consider only direct harm—that
which the plaintiffs alleged to have occurred in Colombia—to be the
kind of harm cognizable by the ATS. It stated that “[t]here is no
allegation that any torture occurred on U.S. territory, or that any other
act constituting a tort in terms of the ATS touched or concerned the
territory of the United States with any force.”76 Had the court heeded
Kiobel’s call it would have considered the plaintiffs’ numerous
allegations of Chiquita’s domestic activity in furtherance of a foreign
result and determined whether this activity constituted relevant conduct.
It would have then, based on these allegations, determined whether the
plaintiffs’ ATS claim touched and concerned the United States with the
requisite force to displace the presumption and provided the reasons
therefore.
Additionally, the court never attributed any significance to the fact
that Chiquita is a U.S.-based corporation. This is due, perhaps, to the
court’s contention that there is no evidence that Congress intended U.S.
nationality to displace the presumption.77 However the Supreme Court
arguably permitted this very consideration by way of the touch and
concern test. In addition, the court never contemplated the related
possibility of the United States providing safe harbor to an alleged aider
and abettor of torture.78 This may be a result of the court’s apparent view
that torture is not a customary international law violation—unless
perhaps committed by a government— so neither would be its aiding and
abetting,79 and the court’s strict and sole allegiance to the question of the
location of the direct harm as dispositive of ATS jurisdiction.80 These
omissions, though, ignore what it likely means for a claim to touch and
concern the United States.
Somewhat similarly, in Balintulo v. Daimler AG, a case brought by
South Africans, involving allegations against numerous multinational

75. Id. at 1189 (majority opinion).
76. Id. at 1191. Additionally, the court suggested that torture is not a law of nations violation and
therefore, may not be cognizable under the ATS. Id. at 1190 (“It is not nearly so clear, as our
dissenting colleague believes, that acts described as ‘torture’ come within the jurisdiction created by
the statute over ‘a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States.’”). This determination ignores powerful evidence to the contrary. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1674 (2013) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing the torture-based ATS
claims in Filartiga and In re Marcos Human Rights Litigation and stating that “in Sosa we referred to
both cases with approval, suggesting that the ATS allowed a claim for relief in such circumstances”).
77. Cardona, 760 F.3d at 1189.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1190.
80. See id. at 1189–90 (“Any tort here, whether styled as torture or under some other theory,
occurred outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. The ATS contains nothing to rebut
the presumption against extraterritoriality.” (emphasis added)); id. at 1191 (“There is no allegation
that any torture occurred on U.S. territory, or that any other act constituting a tort in terms of the ATS
touched or concerned the territory of the United States with any force.”).
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corporations for aiding and abetting torture and murder in South Africa
during its apartheid era, the court concluded that the plaintiffs’
complaint did not allege that any relevant conduct that formed the basis
of their ATS claim occurred in the United States, as required by
Kiobel.81 Further, the court rejected plaintiffs’ notion (borrowed, the
court suggested, from Justice Breyer),82 that corporate citizenship in the
United States is sufficient to ground an ATS claim.83
The court may have, however, overread Kiobel by focusing solely
on relevant conduct. While in Kiobel the Supreme Court stated that
none of the relevant conduct occurred in the United States, it did not
state that only relevant conduct need be considered to determine
whether an ATS claim sufficiently touches and concerns the United
States. Indeed, the Court did not identify in any way the conduct, status,
or relationship that can touch and concern the United States with
sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality.
The Court only suggested that relevant conduct must occur in the United
States, by noting that such conduct was absent in the case before it, and
that “mere corporate presence” is insufficient to displace the
presumption.84 If the Court, though, was leaving it to the lower courts to
determine the meaning of “touch and concern,” the Second Circuit, like
the Eleventh Circuit, has spoken: it does not mean corporate citizenship.
What seemed dispositive for the court was the allegation that the
relevant conduct occurred in a sovereign other than the United States.
Indeed, the court stated that lower courts are bound by the rule that the
ATS does not apply if the relevant conduct occurs outside of the United
States and “are without authority to ‘reinterpret’ the Court’s binding
precedent in light of irrelevant factual distinctions, such as the citizenship
of the defendants.”85 Such a conclusion, in part, rejects the opportunity
to fully engage the question of the ATS’s reach, inclusive of determining
why corporate citizenship is insufficient to displace the presumption, if
that is indeed the view of the court.
Moreover, and perhaps more concerning, is the Second Circuit’s
assertion that for an ATS claim to lie, the law of nations violation—not
merely relevant conduct—must occur in the United States.86 This is the
81. Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 188 (2d Cir. 2013).
82. Id. at 189.
83. Id.
84. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013). The mentioning of corporate
“presence,” however, may suggest a willingness on the part of the Court to deem some variety of
presence, perhaps even citizenship, sufficient to displace the presumption. See infra pp. 472–75, 479–80.
85. Balintulo, 727 F. 3d at 190 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
86. Sometimes the court seemed to equivocate on this point, see id. at 189–92, but reading the
opinion as a whole, it appears that the court believes that the “violation of the law of nations” is the
“relevant conduct” that must occur in the United States. See generally id.; see also Julian Ku,

Goodbye ATS? U.S. Appeals Court Dismisses South African Apartheid ATS Case and Rejects
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view of Justice Alito;87 it is not the stated view of the Supreme Court
majority. But, as discussed above, in Kiobel, the Court never defined
“relevant conduct,”88 just as it never defined “touch and concern.” There
is room in this vacuum for a definition of touch and concern that includes
relevant conduct, ranging from conduct that is material to a customary
international law violation to the customary international law violation
itself, given the significance placed on the location of all material conduct
at international law.89 There is also room in this vacuum for a touch and
concern test that includes corporate citizenship, given the significance
placed on nationality at international law.90
Likewise, in Chowdhury v. Worldtel Bangladesh Holding, Ltd., a
citizen of Bangladesh filed an action alleging torture, pursuant to the
ATS, against another citizen of Bangladesh and a Bangladeshi
corporation, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New
York. The district court found that the plaintiff had established
jurisdiction pursuant to the ATS and the jury later found both the
individual and the corporate defendant liable for torture.91 These
proceedings occurred prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel.
On appeal, the Second Circuit, in a decision issued after Kiobel, vacated
the judgment, concluding that: (1) ATS liability could not lie against
either defendant because all of the events at issue occurred in
Bangladesh and the ATS does not apply to extraterritorial conduct; and

Narrow Reading of Kiobel, Opinio Juris (Aug. 22, 2013), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/08/22/goodbyeats-u-s-appeals-court-dismisses-south-african-apartheid-ats-case-and-rejects-narrow-reading-of-kiobel
(“If Balintulo is followed, the era of ATS lawsuits in the U.S. is coming to an end.”).
87. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1670 (Alito, J., concurring). In his opinion, Justice Alito (joined by
Justice Thomas) stated: “[A] putative ATS cause of action will fall within the scope of the
presumption against extraterritoriality—and will therefore be barred—unless the domestic conduct is
sufficient to violate an international law norm that satisfies Sosa’s requirements of definiteness and
acceptance among civilized nations.” The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama
followed Justice Alito’s approach in Giraldo v. Drummond Co., a case brought by Colombian citizens,
involving allegations of torture and murder, against Alabama-based Drummond Coal Co. and its
affiliates. No. 09-CV-1041-RDP, 2013 WL 3873960 (N.D. Ala. July 25, 2013). The Drummond court
stated that “the most logical and unstrained reading of Kiobel” requires the ATS to apply
extraterritorially only “if the event on which the statute focuses [the law of nations violation] did not
occur abroad.” Id. at *8. According to the court, this is “the seismic shift that Kiobel has caused.” Id. at
*1 (emphasis added). The Kiobel majority opinion, however, simply does not go this far. See Kiobel, 133
S. Ct. at 1669. That opinion does not require the domestic conduct to itself constitute the law of nations
violation.
88. Certainly the Court never conflated “law of nations violation” and “relevant conduct,” as the
Second Circuit seems to do.
89. The majority opinion in Kiobel credibly lends itself to a reading that the presumption against
extraterritoriality can be overcome even if the law of nations violation occurs abroad, provided that
the claim in some way touches and concerns the United States. See generally Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659.
90. See infra pp. 473–76.
91. Chowdhury v. Worldtel Bangl. Holding, Ltd., 746 F.3d 42, 47 (2d Cir. 2014).
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(2) in the Second Circuit, ATS liability cannot lie against a corporation.92
The court did not apply a touch and concern test of any kind. Moreover,
it did not consider any fact or factor that was even akin to a touch and
concern analysis. The court simply employed Kiobel to the end of vacating
the judgment on the ground that the events at issue occurred abroad.
A coherent and nuanced touch and concern test would require
courts to engage the possibility that circumstances exist to displace the
presumption against extraterritoriality. Without the existence and
application of such a test, there is no reason for a court to consider the
location of all of the relevant conduct, the nationality of the defendant,
or other worthy issues, such as whether international comity demands
recognition of ATS jurisdiction (as opposed to the converse), whether
there is a risk of the United States harboring a human rights violator if
ATS jurisdiction is not recognized, and whether the conduct at issue
undermines some other important American national interest.93 These
latter considerations differ from considerations of the location of the
relevant conduct and the defendant’s nationality, which align neatly with
the international jurisdictional norms of territoriality and nationality.
The latter considerations become especially important when a court, like
that in Chowdhury, is presented with allegations that the United States is
neither the location of the relevant conduct nor the country of citizenship
of the defendants.
By considerable contrast to Chiquita, Balintulo, and Chowdhury, in
Al Shimari II, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
concluded that Kiobel requires a “fact-based inquiry”94 to determine
whether the presumption against the extraterritorial application of the
ATS should be displaced. Pursuant to such an inquiry, the court
determined that the plaintiffs’ claims sufficiently touched and concerned
the United States as to displace the presumption. There, Iraqi citizens
sued a U.S. government contractor, alleging that they had been tortured
by the contractor’s employees while detained at the infamous Abu
Ghraib prison in Iraq. The district court concluded that it had no “ATS
jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims because the acts giving rise to their tort
claims occurred exclusively in Iraq, a foreign sovereign.”95 This holding,
the court opined, was consistent with the presumption against
extraterritorial application of the ATS.96 In crafting essentially a
separation of powers argument, the district court further concluded that
it possessed no institutional capacity to displace the presumption,
92. Indeed it was the Second Circuit’s decision in Kiobel, concluding that there was no corporate
liability under the ATS, that the Supreme Court was originally disposed to review. See supra p. 447.
93. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also infra pp. 465–67, 482–83.
94. Al Shimari II, Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 520 (4th Cir. 2014).
95. Al Shimari I, 951 F. Supp. 2d 857, 858 (E.D. Va. 2013).
96. Id.
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observing that the Supreme Court, in Kiobel, impliedly stated that
Congress alone can determine when conduct sufficiently touches and
concerns the United States to dislodge the presumption against
extraterritoriality.97 Moreover, the court dismissed the idea that Kiobel
even suggested that courts consider the facts of individual cases to determine
whether the relevant conduct touches and concerns the United States,
calling the plaintiffs’ contentions to the contrary “demonstrably flawed.”98
In vacating the district court’s decision, the Fourth Circuit stated
that “the clear implication of the [Supreme] Court’s ‘touch and concern’
language is that courts should not assume that the presumption
categorically bars cases that manifest a close connection to United States
territory.”99 Pursuant to this reading of Kiobel, the court considered the
plaintiffs’ allegations, noting their U.S. features, including: the execution
of the contract between the U.S. government and the government
contractor in the United States; the contractor’s incorporation in the
United States; the commission of torture by U.S. citizens; the occurrence of
the torture “at a military facility operated by United States government
personnel”100; the “tacit approval”101 of the torture, “attempt[] to ‘cover up’
the misconduct”102 and, at a minimum, “implicit[] . . . encourage[ment]” of
the torture by “CACI’s managers in the United States.”103 The court also
interpreted congressional intent to indicate a desire to provide judicial
access to aliens and bring U.S. citizens who had committed torture
outside of the United States to justice.104 The court thus considered a
panoply of allegations, including those concerning CACI’s activity in the
United States, to determine that the plaintiffs’ torture claims sufficiently
touched and concerned the United States to displace the presumption
against extraterritoriality.105

97. Id. at 866 (“The Supreme Court makes clear that the presumption against extraterritoriality is
rebuttable by legislative act, not judicial decision”). The court opined that “[n]owhere in the Kiobel
decision does the Court explicitly state or even suggest that the facts of a case should or could, under
certain circumstances, inform a court’s judgment about whether the presumption is sufficiently
rebutted and thus displaced.” Id. at 867. The Supreme Court’s “touch and concern” language,
however, seems to refer to the fact-finding of other courts as the means for determining whether a
claim has a sufficient domestic connection. See infra Part II.
98. Al Shimari I, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 867.
99. Al Shimari II, 758 F.3d at 528.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 531.
102. Id. at 529.
103. Id. at 531.
104. Id.
105. The court noted that when, for example, a case contains a claim alleging that the relevant
contract was “executed by a United States corporation with the United States government . . . it is not
sufficient merely to say that because the actual injuries were inflicted abroad, the claims do not touch
and concern United States territory.” Id. at 528.
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Similarly, in Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively,106 a case brought
by a Uganda-based organization against a U.S. citizen, alleging, amongst
other things, crimes against humanity based upon the persecution of
persons because of their sexual orientation and/or gender identity, the
court stated that the presumption against extraterritoriality was displaced
because the defendant was a U.S. citizen and U.S. resident, and a
substantial part of his alleged wrongful conduct occurred in the United
States.107 Most critically, the court stated, “[t]he fact that the impact of
Defendant’s conduct was felt in Uganda cannot deprive Plaintiff of a
claim.”108 The court opined that the “[d]efendant’s alleged actions in
planning and managing a campaign of repression in Uganda from the
United States are analogous to a terrorist designing and manufacturing a
bomb in this country, which he then mails to Uganda with the intent that
it explode there.”109 Observing that public policy supports recognizing
ATS claims where the defendant committed acts in the United States but
the injury occurred abroad, the court opined that the law of nations
requires that a country make its citizens answer to claims by
foreigners.110 Further, the court asserted that the failure of courts to
recognize these claims could result in the very foreign policy quagmire
sought to be avoided by limiting the claims recognized by the ATS—fear
of retaliation by other sovereigns.111
By recognizing the legal significance of the defendant’s alleged
conduct in the United States, the courts in Al Shimari II and Lively
simultaneously, if tacitly, advanced two key tenets: (1) ATS jurisdiction
can be premised on a claim of aiding and abetting a customary
international law violation, even if the aiding and abetting occurs in the
United States and the direct injury occurs abroad; and (2) aiding and
abetting a customary international law violation is itself a customary
international law violation.112 Additionally, the courts’ consideration of
the defendants’ citizenship as a relevant factor when determining
whether a claim touches and concerns the United States suggests that
while “mere corporate presence” is not enough to satisfy the touch and

106. Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304 (D. Mass. 2013).
107. Id. at 310.
108. Id. at 321–22.
109. Id. at 322.
110. Id. at 323 (“If the court’s decision constitutes a denial of justice, or if it appears to condone
the original wrongful act, under the law of nations the United States would become responsible for the
failure of its courts and be answerable not to the injured alien but to his home state.” (quoting TelOren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 783 (D.C. Cir.1984) (Edwards, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985))).
111. Id. at 322–23.
112. See Keitner, supra note 42, at 79 (observing that “aiding and abetting an international law
violation itself violates international law”). See generally Al Shimari II, 758 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2014);
Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304; infra Part II.C.
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concern test, corporate citizenship might be relevant to this
determination.113 The courts, then, leapt into the space left by Kiobel and
determined that the touch and concern test could be satisfied pursuant to
multiple, if not singular, United States features.114
Somewhat similarly, in Ahmed v. Magan,115 a case brought by one
Somali citizen against another, alleging arbitrary detention, torture, and
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, the magistrate judge concluded
that the plaintiff overcame the presumption against extraterritoriality,
even though this was a foreign-cubed case, because the defendant had
become a U.S. resident.116 The magistrate reasoned that because the
defendant was enjoying the “protections of U.S. law”117 he should also
“be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts.”118 This conclusion aligns
with (although is not identical to) Justice Breyer’s contention that the
presumption should be displaced if the defendant is “an American
national.”119 The court, however, deemed the presumption displaced by
an even looser relationship between the defendant and the United
States.120 The district court accepted the magistrate’s Report and
Recommendation and also began to answer the question of what satisfies
Kiobel’s touch and concern test.121
The above discussion shows that courts are plainly unclear about
how to determine whether a claim touches and concerns the United
States, let alone when it has done so sufficiently to displace the
presumption against extraterritoriality. Courts have considered solely the
location of the law of nations violation and solely the location of the
relevant conduct (to be distinguished from the law of nations violation);
counted and discounted U.S. citizenship; and rejected wholesale the
notion that courts have a role in determining when the presumption can
be displaced. A multifactor test, drawn from Kiobel and international
jurisdictional norms, could provide a clear and predictable approach to
aid courts in determining whether the ATS’s presumption against
extraterritoriality should be displaced.

113. Al Shimari II, 758 F.3d at 528–29; Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d at 322.
114. Al Shimari II, 758 F.3d at 529–30; Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d at 323–24.
115. Ahmed v. Magan, No. 10-CV-00342, 2013 WL 4479077 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 20, 2013).
116. Id. at *1–2.
117. Id. at *2.
118. Id.
119. See supra Part I and note 76.
120. The court deemed the presumption displaced even though the defendant was only a U.S.
resident and not a U.S. national.
121. Magistrate Judge Mark R. Abel entered final judgment against the defendant and awarded the
plaintiff five million dollars in compensatory damages and ten million dollars in punitive damages. Magan,
2013 WL 4479077 at *7. The court held that the defendant had, at any rate, waived its ATS-based defense. Id.
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II. Divining Balancing Factors from KIOBEL’s
“Touch and Concern” Test
In frustratingly few words, the Supreme Court, in Kiobel, intimated
how plaintiffs might establish an ATS claim based, in part, on
extraterritorial conduct.122 The Court stated:
On these facts, all the relevant conduct took place outside the United
States. And even where the claims touch and concern the territory of
the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the
presumption against extraterritorial application. Corporations are
often present in many countries, and it would reach too far to say that
mere corporate presence suffices. If Congress were to determine
otherwise, a statute more specific than the ATS would be required.123

Appearing at the end of the opinion, this language provides ATS
plaintiffs with an “out” that seems almost irreconcilable with the Court’s
prior attenuated discussion about the imperative of applying a statute to
domestic conduct only, unless something in the statute compels
otherwise.124 Here, the Court suggested a way to rebut the presumption
against extraterritoriality applied to the ATS that is, arguably, external to
the statute.
Justice Breyer opined, though, in his concurring opinion, that he
would dispense entirely with the presumption against extraterritoriality
as a relevant canon of statutory interpretation for purposes of the
ATS.125 Instead, he would seek guidance from “international
jurisdictional norms”126 but recognize “jurisdiction only where distinct
American interests are at issue.”127 In his view, the ATS:
[P]rovides jurisdiction where (1) the alleged tort occurs on American
soil, (2) the defendant is an American national, or (3) the defendant’s
conduct substantially and adversely affects an important American
national interest, and that includes a distinct interest in preventing the
United States from becoming a safe harbor (free of civil as well as
criminal liability) for a torturer or other common enemy of mankind.128

122. Professor Cleveland correctly notes that this is the “most important part of the majority
opinion.” Cleveland, supra note 8, at 9. She also importantly observes that “the opinion states that it is
‘the claim’ that must touch and concern the United States, not ‘the conduct.’ In other words, the concerns
underlying the presumption would allow for considerations not limited to the locus of conduct.” Id. at 21.
(emphasis in original).
123. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
124. See id. at 1661 (“[W]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it
has none . . . .” (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010))); id. at 1669
(“We therefore conclude that the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the
ATS, and that nothing in the statute rebuts that presumption.”).
125. Id. at 1671–72 (Breyer, J., concurring).
126. Id. at 1673.
127. Id. at 1674.
128. Id.
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It is discussion about the latter consideration—preventing the United
States from becoming a safe harbor for a torturer or their ilk—that
formed much of Justice Breyer’s concurrence. This concern
acknowledges the requirement, at least to Justice Breyer, that there be
an available court for litigating human rights claims, and the leadership
role of the United States in creating and preserving this space.129
However, while Justice Breyer’s concern is clear, his three-pronged
test is less so. It is unclear whether this first prong contemplates solely
the direct injury to the plaintiff or also the predicate acts that gave rise to
the direct injury,130 ratification of the direct injury, ratification of the
predicate acts, etc.131 Likewise, it is unclear whether the second prong
refers to individuals as well as corporations.
It is clear, however, that prongs one and two do not contemplate a
foreign-cubed case. While theoretically prong three could embrace a
foreign-cubed case—given that the conduct in that case could
substantially and adversely affect an important American national
interest; for example, providing forced laborers with access to a
remedy132 or bringing to justice a material supporter of genocide133—
Justice Breyer did not deem the conduct alleged in Kiobel, including
129. Indeed, Justice Breyer quoted Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004), stating:
“[F]or purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become—like the pirate and slave trader before
him—hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.” Id. at 1671 (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732)
(internal citation omitted). Invocation of this part of Sosa reifies the notion that Justice Breyer
recognizes the role that the ATS can play in holding to account human rights abusers.
130. One cannot merely assume that Justice Breyer means both direct and indirect harm by this
prong—despite the fact that he invoked section 402 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations,
which advances the idea that territorial jurisdiction be based on both direct and indirect activity—
given that he accorded no legal significance to the fact that the Kiobel plaintiffs accused the
defendants of indirect liability and not direct liability. Indeed, he seemed to consider this allegation as
further evidence of the propriety of not finding that the plaintiffs’ claims sufficiently touched and
concerned the United States. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1678 (“The plaintiffs are not United States
nationals but nationals of other nations. The conduct at issue took place abroad. And the plaintiffs
allege, not that the defendants directly engaged in acts of torture, genocide, or the equivalent, but that
they helped others (who are not American nationals) to do so.”).
131. As the discussion about the post-Kiobel cases shows, it is important to disaggregate what a
court must consider when determining whether a claim touches and concerns the United States to
ensure that a court consider all information relevant to that inquiry. See supra Part I.
132. The United States is a signatory to the U.N. Charter, the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention Against Torture), the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
which promote freedom, justice, and self-determination for all. See generally International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 112; Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III)A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948); U.N.
Charter.
133. See 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (2014) (criminalizing genocide and recognizing jurisdiction over a perpetrator
of genocide even if the genocide is not committed in the United States and the perpetrator is not a U.S.
national, provided that the perpetrator is a permanent legal resident of the United States, “a stateless person
whose habitual residence is in the United States,” or simply “present in the United States”).
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aiding and abetting torture and other crimes against humanity, sufficient
to warrant a finding of ATS jurisdiction, calling into serious question the
allegations that could satisfy this prong.
In the Torture Victim Protection Act (“TVPA”), the companion
statute to the ATS, Congress created a cause of action for torture to be
brought by and against “individuals.”134 Courts have interpreted this
right of action as belonging to both U.S. and foreign nationals.135
Consequently, the TVPA is a clear example of the United States’ interest
in providing victims of torture with access to a remedy. Moreover, the
United States is a signatory to human rights agreements that forbid many
of the very events alleged in Kiobel, including the Convention Against
Torture, the U.N. Charter, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.136 The
TVPA was, in fact, passed “to carry out obligations of the United States
under the United Nations Charter and other international agreements
pertaining to the protection of human rights.”137 One would think the
TVPA and these agreements sufficient evidence of U.S. interest in
providing access to a remedy for torture. Failure to recognize ATS
jurisdiction over a claim that includes aiding and abetting torture, even if
committed by foreign nationals, would seem to undermine that interest.
Perhaps under Justice Breyer’s third prong, the defendant or the tort
must have some direct connection to the United States, for example,
satisfaction of prong one or two, such that the defendant could more
directly affect an “important American national interest” (in other
words, such that the United States would be implicated, in some more
meaningful way, by the defendant’s actions).138
Justice Breyer’s last prong is also vague because it contains limited
guidance as to the categories of American national interests that the
ATS should protect. Moreover, Justice Breyer gave no guidance as to
how and when to determine whether the defendant’s effect on such an
interest is “substantial” or “adverse.” (Again, the aiding and abetting
torture allegation of the Kiobel plaintiffs did not, according to Justice
Breyer, rise to the level of “substantially and adversely affect[ing] an
important American national interest.”139) Neither did he speak to the
kind of “residence” in the United States that might give rise to safe

134. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
135. See Baloco v. Drummond Co., 640 F.3d 1338, 1346 (11th Cir. 2011); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola
Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1263–64 (11th Cir. 2009), abrogated on other grounds by Mohamad v. Palestinian
Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702 (2012); see also Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 247 (2d Cir. 2003).
136. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
137. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73.
138. See Wuerth, supra note 12, at 611–12 (observing that the defendants’ U.S. office was
insufficient to satisfy Justice Breyer’s test).
139. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1671 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring).
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harbor concerns. He does suggest that the United States could become a
safe harbor for today’s pirates if there is no civil or criminal liability
attached to their behavior.140 But given the existence of other sources of
liability for torts that occur on American soil and torts committed by
American nationals (for example, state law claims and the TVPA) and
for related crimes (for example, assault, battery, and conspiracy), Justice
Breyer’s safe harbor argument, without qualification, may never be a
credible basis for exercising ATS jurisdiction over an alleged customary
international law violation.
Whatever questions these offerings raise, they do nonetheless
provide some of the anatomy for a broader touch and concern test.
Importantly, they underscore the primacy of “international jurisdictional
norms” in determining when U.S. courts should exercise jurisdiction over
customary international law claims. Indeed, an appropriate touch and
concern test would not only contemplate but promote these norms. This
Article seeks to do that by suggesting a test that considers, subject to
reasonableness,141 territorial and national jurisdiction, two principles well
established at international law.
The proposed test has six factors. The first three factors align with
these jurisdictional principles. Each of these factors, however, must be
balanced against each of the last three factors of the test—which
generally, although not exclusively, concern policy—for a court to
determine whether an ATS claim sufficiently touches and concerns the
United States to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality. The
factors are:
1. The location of the alleged law of nations violation;
2. The location of other alleged relevant conduct;
3. The nationality of the defendant;142
4. The demands of international comity;
5. The likelihood that ATS jurisdiction denial could result in
United States harboring a human rights violator; and

140. Id.
141. Despite grounds for the exercise of each type of jurisdiction, a court must refrain from
exercising jurisdiction if it would be unreasonable to do so. To determine reasonableness, a court must
consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to: the link between the activity and the
regulating state; nationality, residence, or economic activity in the regulating state; justified expectations;
significance of the regulation internationally; consistency with international tradition; and another
state’s competing regulatory interests. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 403 (1987).
142. This Article proposes alternative language to that in Justice Breyer’s first two prongs. The
language chosen seeks to avoid the barrier to finding that the conduct at issue has touched and
concerned the United States because the law of nations violation or other relevant conduct did not
occur in the United States or the defendant is not a U.S. citizen. The proposed language might allow
the factors to operate more freely as one of several factors to consider when determining whether the
presumption should be displaced.
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6. Any other American national interest that supports the
recognition of subject matter jurisdiction.143

If the alleged law of nations violation or other relevant conduct occurred
in the United States, then barring a countervailing weight (for example,
international comity demands and unreasonableness), a court would likely
deem the plaintiff’s claim, pursuant to the territorial jurisdiction
principle, sufficient to displace the presumption. The same would be true
if the defendant is a U.S. national, pursuant to the nationality jurisdiction
principle.
In some instances a court’s disposition of the proposed touch and
concern test will be more fraught politically, if not analytically. This will
especially be the case if the alleged law of nations violation or other
relevant conduct did not occur in the United States and the defendant is
not a U.S. national—in other words, in a foreign-cubed case.
Nonetheless, requiring courts to genuinely grapple with the propriety of
exercising jurisdiction over this type of case is one of the goals of the
proposed test. Presented with these facts, courts should engage in a
refined analysis of the last three factors to determine whether the
application of one of them alone, or in combination with one or more
additional factors, warrants displacing the presumption.
The possibilities for satisfying the proposed test, and thus displacing
the presumption, are numerous—for example, alleged law of nations
violation in the United States by a U.S. national with no compelling
counterargument; other alleged relevant conduct in the United States
plus a safe harbor argument, and no compelling counterargument; no
alleged domestic tort or U.S. nationality, but allegations of heinous acts
invoking the compelling American national interest in recognizing
universal jurisdiction.144 Likewise plentiful are the possibilities for
finding the test unmet, and thus maintaining the presumption—for
example, failure of all factors; no alleged domestic conduct, no U.S.
nationality, and no compelling American national interest; other alleged
relevant conduct in the United States but compelling international

143. By contrast, Professor Steinhardt suggested that the touch and concern inquiry not,
turn[] . . . on the territoriality of the wrong or the citizenship of the defendant but
on . . . the nature of the breach; statements of interest . . . ; the exhaustion of local
remedies . . . ; . . . the act of state doctrine and the political question doctrine; whether a
federal court is a forum of necessity or forum non conveniens; and the links of the plaintiff
to the United States.
Steinhardt, supra note 8, at 843.
144. See Anthony J. Colangelo, The Legal Limits of Universal Jurisdiction, 47 Va. J. Int’l L. 149,
150–51 (2006) (“Unlike other bases of jurisdiction in international law, universal jurisdiction requires
no territorial or national nexus to the alleged act or actors over which a state legitimately may claim
legal authority. Universal jurisdiction instead is based entirely on the commission of certain ‘universal
crimes.’” (citations omitted)); see infra Part II.F.
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comity demands. A coherent touch and concern test can provide courts
with a matrix for answering the challenging question of the ATS’s
extraterritorial reach. A consideration of each test factor is below.
A. The Location of the Alleged Law of Nations Violation
According to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations, a State
has jurisdiction over “conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes
place within its territory.”145 This principle of “territorial jurisdiction”
codifies, in essence, the natural assumption that, as an attribute of
sovereignty, a territory would have cognizance over events that take
place within its borders. It is no stretch, then, for a court to deem a claim
as sufficiently touching and concerning the United States, for ATS
purposes, if the claim arises in the United States where U.S. courts are
predisposed to recognize territorial jurisdiction, assuming no compelling
countervailing factors or unreasonableness.
Pursuant to this factor, not just any claim will do; the claim must
consist of a law of nations violation. Moreover, the law of nations at issue
must satisfy Sosa’s requirement of specificity and universal acceptance.146
This factor most readily contemplates claims of direct harm suffered by
the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s decedent at the hands of the defendant.147
The claims that often result from this kind of harm are torture and
extrajudicial killing, well-established law of nations violations that meet
the Sosa standard.148 If these claims are premised on conduct in the
United States, they would, given the territorial jurisdiction principle,
sufficiently touch and concern the United States to warrant ATS
jurisdiction.
This factor might also be used, though, to determine whether
behavior that gave rise to the direct harm (but did not constitute it) could
still touch and concern the United States with sufficient force to displace
the statute. For example, a plaintiff might allege that the defendant aided
and abetted the direct harm and that the alleged aiding and abetting
itself constituted a law of nations violation. Indeed, this aiding and

145. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 402(1)(a) (1987).
146. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004); see supra note 53.
147. As a practical matter, the overwhelming majority of direct injuries in ATS cases will likely occur
on foreign soil and, indeed, in a developing country. See supra note 51 and accompanying text; see also
Penny M. Venetis, The Broad Jurisprudential Significance of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: An Honest

Assessment of the Role of Federal Judges and Why Customary International Law Can Be More Effective
than Constitutional Law for Redressing Serious Abuses, 21 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 41, 45–46
(2011) (observing the prevalence of ATS cases that occur abroad and concern solely foreign actors).
148. See Chavez v. Carranza, 413 F. Supp. 2d 891, 899 (W.D. Tenn. 2005) (regarding torture and
extrajudicial killing); Doe v. Rafael Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1153–54 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (regarding
extrajudicial killing).
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abetting claim may be the only claim that the plaintiff brings pursuant to
the ATS.149
Aiding and abetting claims brought under the ATS are common
because they reflect some of the alleged behavior of corporate
tortfeasors.150 However, there is a question of whether aiding and
abetting a customary international law violation is itself a customary
international law violation subject to civil jurisdiction.151 There are other
uncertainties in the law about the proper treatment of the aiding and
abetting claim under the ATS.152 As a result, to evaluate such a claim
under this factor, a court would have to determine: whether aiding and
abetting claims are themselves customary international law violations
subject to civil redress; whether they must satisfy Sosa153 (and, if they do,
whether the claims satisfy the criteria); and the proper mens rea for this
claim and whether the plaintiff has alleged it.154 If a court deems aiding
and abetting cognizable under the ATS and the plaintiff properly states
the claim, this should significantly advance the plaintiff’s touch and
concern argument, particularly if the aiding and abetting occurred in the
United States.155
As discussed above, Justice Alito would read the presumption
against extraterritoriality to mean that the ATS provides jurisdiction
only for a law of nations violation that meets the Sosa standard and
occurs in the United States (as opposed to other conduct relevant to the
law of nations violation that occurs in the United States).156 While

149. See also Keitner, supra note 42, at 102 (“Although accomplice liability does in some sense
depend upon wrongdoing by the principal, it can be adjudicated independent of the principal’s liability.”).
150. See Introduction, supra.
151. See Ingrid Wuerth, The Alien Tort Statute and the Federal Common Law: A New Approach,
85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1931, 1949 (2010) (observing that “aiding and abetting liability is well established
in international law in the criminal context, but not necessarily the civil” (emphasis in original)).
Further, at least one commentator believes that aiding and abetting liability may not even be available
pursuant to the ATS given that the ATS provides jurisdiction for torts in “violation of the law of
nations” and not for torts that aid and abet this violation. See Bradley, supra note 4, at 1834. Professor
Bradley also opines that Congress, in a criminal statute enacted during the time of the ATS’s
enactment, demonstrated that it knew how to expressly provide for jurisdiction over aiding and
abetting liability claims and that it did not so provide in the ATS strongly suggests that Congress did
not intend for the ATS to confer jurisdiction over this kind of liability. See id.
152. See Wuerth, supra note 12, at 602–03.
153. See Wuerth, supra note 151, at 1947 (observing that aiding and abetting claims satisfy Sosa).
154. See Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 320 (D. Mass. 2013) (in noting
the propriety of bringing an aiding and abetting claim pursuant to the ATS, the court also recognized
the intercircuit split on the proper mens rea for aiding and abetting liability under customary
international law).
155. See Hoffman, supra note 58, at 46 (“Human rights violations committed extraterritorially at
the direction of actors within U.S. territory will likely overcome the presumption.”).
156. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1670 (Alito, J., concurring). If Justice
Alito refers only to direct injury, then his interpretation is troubling for two key reasons: (1) many
ATS defendants do not commit wholesale human rights abuses in the United States (they know better
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deeming aiding and abetting a customary international law violation
sufficient to ground ATS jurisdiction may not have been what Justice
Alito had in mind (because this would not require the direct injury to
occur in the United States), it may satisfy his test—that the law of nations
violation occur in the United States.157 A court should consider whether
any conduct short of a law of nations violation suffices to touch and
concern the United States pursuant to the next factor.
B. The Location of Other Alleged Relevant Conduct
This factor takes into account the location of conduct that may not
constitute the alleged law of nations violation itself, but is nonetheless
material to the occurrence of the violation, furthers the violation, ratifies
the violation, etc.158 Such conduct might include a variety of activities
that give rise to the ultimate harm, such as planning, ordering, financing,
or providing other substantial assistance.159 Any of the above conduct in
the United States could, pursuant to the territorial jurisdiction principle,
result in displacement of the presumption against extraterritoriality.160
Courts would have to determine whether the claim before them contains
the quantum of domestic conduct that warrants this displacement and if
the exercise of jurisdiction would be reasonable.
The simple reality—as the Ruggie Report reveals—is that corporate
human rights abuses abound161 and many of the victims of these abuses
accuse corporations of planning, ordering, encouraging, or providing
material support for a law of nations violation from the United States,
sometimes with intent to cause the law of nations violation to occur
abroad.162 The victims frequently bring their claims pursuant to the

than to do that); and (2) failure to legally recognize the predicate acts to the harm potentially shields
an entire category of malfeasance from legal liability.
157. It is unclear whether, pursuant to Justice Alito’s approach, the ATS would reach domestic
and extraterritorial conduct if the ultimate harm and customary international law violation occurred in
the United States but the predicate acts giving rise to the harm occurred abroad. There is nothing,
though, about his framework that seems to deny this exercise of ATS jurisdiction.
158. See Wuerth, supra note 12, at 608 (noting that the Court’s “touch and concern” language
might mean that “something less than domestic conduct that violates international law under the Sosa
test” could satisfy the test (emphasis in original)).
159. Id.; see also Roger Alford, Kiobel Insta-Symposium: Degrees of Territoriality, Opinion Juris
(Apr. 22, 2013, 9:56 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/22/kiobel-insta-symposium-degrees-ofterritoriality (providing an expansive list of activities that might satisfy the touch and concern test,
including “execution,” “cross-border conduct,” “planning and authorization,” “design and testing,”
“training,” “construction,” “contracting,” “financing and money transfers,” “electronic
communications,” “unlawful gains,” and “extraterritorial territory”).
160. A court might consider aiding and abetting claims pursuant to this factor if it concludes that aiding
and abetting a customary international law violation is not itself a customary international law violation.
161. See supra pp. 450–52.
162. See supra pp. 450–52.
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ATS.163 This factor provides an opportunity for courts to evaluate all of
the conduct that is relevant to the claim brought under the ATS (other
than the law of nations violation itself), determine where it occurred, and
ultimately conclude whether, on balance and subject to reasonableness, it
suffices to displace the presumption.
C. The Nationality of the Defendant
Justice Breyer would consider whether “the defendant is an
American national” to help determine whether the conduct at issue
touched and concerned the United States sufficient to displace the
presumption.164 For reasons discussed below, this Article supports this
notion but clarifies that this factor applies to both the corporate and the
individual defendant.165 Whether juridical or natural, “an American
national” has perhaps the strongest possible tie to the United States.166
Consequently any claim against U.S. nationals must, by virtue of identity,
touch and concern the United States.167
Exercising jurisdiction based upon nationality would also align with
an international jurisdictional norm, which contemplates jurisdiction
over a national’s activities whether they occur inside or outside the State.
The United States has codified the exercise of this jurisdiction in the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,168 pursuant to which the United States

163. See Beth Stephens et al., International Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 309 (2d
rev. ed. 2008).
164. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also
Oona Hathaway, Kiobel Commentary: The Door Remains Open to “Foreign Squared” Cases,
SCOTUS Blog (Apr. 18, 2013, 4:27 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/kiobel-commentary-thedoor-remains-open-to-foreign-squared-cases (stating that post-Kiobel there may be “renewed focus of
ATS litigation on U.S. corporations” (emphasis added)).
165. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 402 (1987). See generally Barcelona
Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain) 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5). But see Balintulo v.
Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 190, n.24 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Nothing in the Court’s reasoning in Kiobel
suggests that the rule of law it applied somehow depends on a defendant’s citizenship. Indeed, the
presumption of extraterritoriality traditionally has ‘focused on the site of the conduct, not the identity
of the defendant.’” (citations omitted) (quoting Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F. 3d 11, 74–76 (D.C.
Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting))).
166. Moreover, as Professor Hoffman notes, the Supreme Court “will struggle to distinguish a
future case involving extraterritorial international law violations committed by U.S. citizens from the
[Attorney General William] Bradford opinion, one of the few historical records discussing causes of
action cognizable under the ATS and finding the acts of U.S. citizens on foreign sovereign territory
among them.” Hoffman, supra note 58, at 45.
167. Additionally, finding the touch and concern question satisfied on the basis of U.S. citizenship
avoids international comity concerns. See id. Further, as Professor Hoffman writes: “The United
States has an indisputable right under international law to apply such norms to its own citizens no
matter where the offending acts occurred. Indeed, the United States may have a duty to do so.” Id.;
See also Cleveland, supra note 8, at 23 (noting that “offenses committed by U.S. citizens against
foreign nationals (who are the only valid plaintiffs under the ATS) would fall squarely within the state
responsibility view of the purposes of the ATS”).
168. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2014).
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can exercise jurisdiction over a U.S. national for activities that allegedly
occurred abroad. This statute, in part, prohibits a “United States
person”169 from using “the mails or any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment,
promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift,
promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value to”170 a
foreign official to induce that foreign official to act in her official capacity.171
Additionally, the nationality of the U.S. corporation is especially
important to the touch and concern question because the U.S.
corporation: (1) relies on the protection of U.S. laws;172 (2) resides in a
country that is obliged, pursuant to international law, to provide alleged
victims of human rights abuses with access to a remedy;173 and (3) resides
in a country that has in recent years committed itself to the vision of the
Guiding Principles,174 which expressly advocate providing victims of
corporate human rights abuses with access to a remedy. For all of these
reasons, if the defendant is a U.S. corporation, that fact should weigh
strongly in favor of satisfying the touch and concern question and, thus,
displacing the presumption against extraterritoriality.
This factor also advances the Court’s apparent requirement that the
corporate presence in the United States be significant in order to
dislodge the presumption, given that in Kiobel the Court rejected “mere
corporate presence” in the United States as sufficient to do so.175 By this

169. Id. § 78dd-1(g)(2) (defining “United States person” as “a national of the United States . . . or
any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust, unincorporated
organization, or sole proprietorship organized under the laws of the United States or any State,
territory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States, or any political subdivision thereof”).
170. Id. § 78dd-2(a).
171. Id. § 78dd-2(a)(1).
172. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (“[T]o the extent that a
corporation exercises the privilege of conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and
protection of the laws of that state. The exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations . . . .”).
173. The United States became a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (“ICCPR”) in 1992. The ICCPR speaks to the civil and political rights of “all members of the
human family,” International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Preamble, Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171, and expressly requires that the treaty’s signatories provide persons who claim a
violation of their rights access to a remedy. See id. at art. 2 (“Each State Party . . . undertakes: (a) To
ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms . . . are violated shall have an effective remedy . . .
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by
competent . . . authorities . . . and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy . . . .”).
174. Daniel Baer, Deputy Assistant Sec’y of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor,
General Statement, Address Before the Human Rights Council (June 16, 2011), transcript available at
http://www.humanrights.gov/2011/06/16/businesses-and-transnational-corporations-have-a-responsibilityto-respect-human-rights (“The United States would like to . . . express our support and commitment to
working to make the vision of the Guiding Principles a reality where it matters most—on the ground
for people and businesses.”).
175. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.
Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013). Justice Breyer agreed with the majority’s view and made clear that achieving the
requisite level of corporate presence was not as simple as gaining general jurisdiction. Id. at 1678
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language, the Court seems to be discussing corporate size and corporate
ties. The Court’s language reflects a concern about the foreign
corporation that has opened an office in the United States for limited
purposes—for example, to provide a registered agent for service of
process. This argument is furthered by the fact that the defendants in
Kiobel were foreign corporations. The Court perhaps was commenting as
much on the reality of that case as on the norm that should be followed
in future ATS cases.176 Conversely, a defendant that is incorporated in
the United States and operates therein as a going concern seems to be
something other than “merely present.”177 The Court’s “mere corporate
presence” language may well require a relationship between a
corporation and the United States that is more explicitly linked—that of
national to country.178
The proposed touch and concern test should not fail, however, if the
defendant is not a U.S. citizen. The plaintiff’s case simply would not be
advanced based upon this factor. Any one or more of the other factors,
on balance, could satisfy the test.
D. The Demands of International Comity
In recent jurisprudence—Sosa, Kiobel, and Daimler AG v.
Bauman—the Supreme Court has evinced an overarching concern about

possible intrusion into another sovereign’s activities if U.S. courts were
to recognize ATS jurisdiction.179 This factor appeals to that
preoccupation. It also comports with international jurisdictional norms, as
it would require a court to consider the interests of foreign sovereigns180
and the executive branch as grounds for recognizing or denying ATS
jurisdiction, subject to reasonableness.
As with factors one through three, this factor should operate freely
so that a court might truly measure whether it weighs in favor of ATS
jurisdiction denial. Without this factor—framed in these terms—there is
the risk of courts drawing the line of permissible federal judicial activity

(Breyer, J., concurring). Moreover, the Justice opined that the corporate presence must be sufficiently
great that failure to provide a human rights liability scheme could result in the United States harboring
a human rights violator. Id.; see also Wuerth, supra note 12, at 612 (“The facts of Kiobel did not satisfy
Justice Breyer’s test, however, as the defendants’ only connection to the United States was a New
York office owned by an affiliated company that helped attract capital investors.”).
176. The sentence “[c]orporations are often present in many countries,” Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669,
also begs explanation. Again, though, the Court seemed to be focused on companies that are not “at
home,” whether foreign corporations that are operating in the United States or U.S. corporations that
are operating abroad.
177. See supra note 169 and accompanying text; supra pp. 473–74.
178. One could interpret this statement, however, to mean that no corporate presence, regardless
of size, suffices alone to displace the presumption.
179. See generally Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659.
180. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations §§ 403(2)(g)–(h), 403(3) (1987).
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too near. So, instead of reacting precipitously when entertaining a matter
with significant foreign connections, courts should fully engage the
questions of competing foreign interests and foreign affairs intervention.
To do this, courts should not assume the existence of an international
comity issue, warranting ATS claim dismissal, merely because the claim
at issue is foreign-cubed or foreign-squared (a foreign plaintiff and a
foreign defendant or a tort that occurred in a foreign country).181 It also
means evaluating the propriety of ATS jurisdiction pursuant to the other
proposed factors—irrespective of possible international comity issues—
especially those that seek to determine whether the denial of jurisdiction
could reasonably result in the United States harboring a human rights
violator, and whether there exists an important American national
interest that should be vindicated. The result of these inquiries could
warrant overriding any international comity concerns.
Imagine a case brought in the United States, pursuant to the ATS,
by former child soldiers, citizens of another country, against a foreign
corporation for aiding and abetting a foreign paramilitary group in
torturing the children. The paramilitary group funds its activities through
the sale of “conflict minerals.” The activities of this paramilitary group
are condemned globally and the conflict violates international law. All
relevant events occurred abroad. The country where the events occurred
does not want the U.S. court to recognize jurisdiction. This country would
deem the rejection of ATS jurisdiction an exercise of international comity.
This request notwithstanding, one American national interest
perhaps should give the court pause: The United States opposes even
indirect financial support of those engaged in illegal conflicts, as
evidenced by the new Securities and Exchange Commission conflict
minerals rules.182 This factor would allow a court to balance this interest
against that of the foreign country183 before summarily denying ATS
jurisdiction on international comity grounds.184
U.S. courts should certainly give all due deference to a foreign
government—especially that of the country where the direct harm
occurred and possibly that of the defendant’s resident country—if it
requests that U.S. courts deny ATS jurisdiction.185 However, it is
181. As fairly recent cases reveal, international comity may demand recognition of ATS
jurisdiction. See generally Jota v. Texaco Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998); Mamani v. Berzaín, Nos.
07–22459–CIV, 08–21063–CIV, 2014 WL 2069491 (S.D. Fla. May 20, 2014).
182. See 17 CFR § 240.13p–1 (2012); supra note 36 and accompanying text.
183. A court could also evaluate a circumstance such as the one presented under the last factor,
concerning the protection of American national interests.
184. A U.S. court might choose to recognize jurisdiction pursuant to this factor if the country
requesting abstention cannot itself provide the plaintiffs with access to a remedy.
185. There are, of course, other very practical issues which courts must address when determining
the propriety of invoking international comity as a ground for rejecting ATS jurisdiction, including
determining the status of the person who is best poised to make the international comity argument on
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conceivable that the interests of the United States and the objecting
foreign country would conflict. In that instance, protection of the
American national interest should prevail, despite the comity demands.
This is especially the case where one or more of the other factors
denominated above (or an allegation of a universal offense, such as
genocide, slavery, piracy, and war crimes186) suggests that the United
States recognize ATS jurisdiction.187
E. Likelihood That ATS Jurisdiction Denial Could Result in the
United States Harboring a Human Rights Violator
Congress passed the ATS, in part, to provide jurisdiction over
pirates,188 those persons who act everywhere but should be at home
nowhere. The ATS provided a means for ensuring that pirates would not
be at home in the United States as they might be haled into a U.S. court
and held accountable for their actions.189 This safe harbor concern
persists today, as Justice Breyer opined in Kiobel.190
As noted above, Justice Breyer suggested that ATS jurisdiction lie
where “the defendant’s conduct substantially and adversely affects an
important American national interest, and that includes a distinct
interest in preventing the United States from becoming a safe harbor
(free of civil as well as criminal liability) for a torturer or other common
enemy of mankind.”191 This Article suggests that whether the
defendants’ conduct substantially and adversely affects an important
American national interest and whether the choice not to recognize ATS
jurisdiction could result in providing safe harbor to a human rights
violator be considered separately to encourage a discussion on each
issue. This Subpart discusses what a court should contemplate when
determining whether the denial of ATS jurisdiction could reasonably
result in the United States harboring a human rights violator. (The next
behalf of foreign interests—a foreign government representative? If so, which? A party to the suit? A
trade association? Scholars? Whom?
186. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 404 (1987).
187. Additionally, failure of the United States to recognize ATS jurisdiction could, in some
instances, create the very international strife that it seeks to avoid by invoking international comity, as
the court in Lively observed. See supra pp. 461–62; Marco Basile, The Long View on Kiobel: A Muted
Victory for International Legal Norms in the United States?, in Agora: Reflections on Kiobel, supra
note 8, at e-13, e-17 (“[D]eclining to adjudicate a case involving an international issue can affect
foreign relations as much as hearing the case.” (citing Noah Feldman, When Judges Make Foreign
Policy, N.Y. Times Mag., Sept. 28, 2008, at MM50)).
188. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724–25 (2004); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1671 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring); supra note 4 and accompanying text.
189. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (finding that pirates are an enemy of all mankind); Kiobel, 133 S. Ct.
at 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring) (finding that “[i]nternational norms have long included a duty not to
permit a nation to become a safe harbor for pirates (or their equivalent)”) (citations omitted).
190. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1671–73 (Breyer, J. concurring).
191. Id. at 1674.
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Subpart will discuss other reasons, consistent with American national
priorities, why a U.S. court might recognize ATS jurisdiction.) Further,
this Subpart contends that the availability of alternative civil liability be
considered only where federal courts and federal law are concerned. This
Subpart also suggests that the availability of criminal liability not be
considered at all.
Any of the following in the United States should trigger a court’s
inquiry concerning “harboring”: citizenship, nationality, incorporation,
residency, or significant corporate presence.192 If “harbor” means to
provide shelter,193 then citizenship, nationality, incorporation, and legal
permanent residency are proper considerations because they essentially
mean that the “home” (or at least a home) of the citizen, national,
corporation, or resident at issue is the United States.194
Further, to evaluate whether denial of ATS jurisdiction could result
in the United States harboring a corporate human rights violator,
assuming that the corporate defendant is not a U.S. national, a court
must first consider whether the corporate presence at issue is significant.
To wit, a court must determine either that the presence is so
unremarkable that failure to exercise ATS jurisdiction could not
reasonably result in the United States harboring a human rights violator,
or the converse. A court could measure significance by evaluating the
following factors: (1) corporate headquarters in the United States; (2) the
amount of annual revenue, in raw dollars, derived from the U.S. market;
(3) the number of employees in the United States; (4) the number of
offices in the United States; (5) the benefits, including tax breaks,
received by virtue of operating in the United States; and (6) the use of
the United States’ legal system, including the filing of civil suits.
Evaluating these factors, none of which is necessarily dispositive, should
assist a court in determining whether the corporation is more than
“merely present” in the United States and, if so, whether the extent of
that presence could reasonably result in the United States harboring a
human rights violator if a court does not recognize ATS jurisdiction.
Considering these factors, amongst others, would prevent a court’s
peremptory conclusion that a corporation does not have the requisite
U.S. presence to displace the presumption.
In determining whether the failure to recognize ATS jurisdiction
would result in a safe harbor issue, a court should not consider the
possible causes of action or jurisdictional grounds available to the
plaintiff in state courts, as such a requirement would impose an undue
192. See Cleveland, supra note 8, at 24, on the variety of circumstances that might give rise to “safe
harbor” concerns (“Justice Breyer’s category at a minimum would capture such persons who later
remain in the United States for a sufficient period to suggest that the country is a safe harbor.”).
193. Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 529 (10th ed. 1994) (defining harbor).
194. This would be true even if the corporation at issue has a presence in another country.
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burden on the court, and one of the purposes of the ATS is to provide
federal jurisdiction for torts that are customary international law
violations.195 So, even if the plaintiff could bring a state common law
claim in federal or state court, such an option would arguably defeat the
goal of the ATS. A court should, however, determine whether the
plaintiff could bring another federal human rights claim against the
defendant based upon another source of federal jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, out of a sense of fairness and respect for the plaintiff’s
privilege as the master of their complaint, courts should only compare
causes of action where the plaintiff can sue the same defendant sued
pursuant to the ATS.
The most obvious statutory alternative to the customary
international law claims recognized by the ATS is the TVPA—a plaintiff
would allege jurisdiction over a TVPA claim pursuant to the federal
question jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331.196 The TVPA provides a
right of action for an individual, a legal representative, or other rightful
legal claimant against another individual for torture and/or extrajudicial
killing committed “under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of
any foreign nation.”197 If, pursuant to the ATS, the plaintiff sued a
natural person for a customary international law violation that required a
showing of state action, and the plaintiff’s claims could credibly be
refashioned as claims of torture and/or extrajudicial killing, the
possibility of a TVPA claim might warrant denial of ATS jurisdiction.
While there is overlapping focus between the ATS and the TVPA,
there are also critical distinctions that may result in a claim under the
TVPA being a poor substitute for one under the ATS. For example, under
the TVPA, a plaintiff can only sue a natural person.198 Accordingly,
under this statute, the plaintiff would be precluded from suing a
corporation.199 Additionally, as just noted, TVPA claims are limited to
torture and extrajudicial killing. Generally acceptable ATS claims, by
contrast, include and extend beyond torture and extrajudicial killing to
genocide, slavery, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.200 Moreover,

195. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting “the wisdom of the First
Congress in vesting jurisdiction over [torts in violation of the law of nations] in the federal district
courts through the Alien Tort Statute” and that “[q]uestions of this nature are fraught with
implications for the nation as a whole, and therefore should not be left to the potentially varying
adjudications of the courts of the fifty states”).
196. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2014).
197. Id. § 1350(2)(a).
198. Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1705 (2012).
199. Even if the plaintiff were to sue an individual corporate agent, the plaintiff’s actual recovery
in meritorious cases would likely be limited and the deterrence value of bringing a human rights abuse
claim against a corporation dulled.
200. See Am. Soc’y of Int’l Law, Benchbook on International Law, pp. III.E-13–14 nn.42–49
(Dianne Marie Amann ed., 2014) for a comprehensive list of relevant cases.
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the plaintiff must prove state action for all TVPA claims,201 a significant
hurdle202 that the plaintiff need not surmount with all ATS claims.203
Therefore, if a plaintiff sued a corporation for a customary international
law violation pursuant to the ATS, a court should consider the TVPA claim
inapposite as another source of federal law. This is the kind of
consideration that a court should make before denying ATS jurisdiction on
the theory that the plaintiff could bring another federal human rights claim.
Finally, a court should not consider the possibility of criminal
liability for the defendants based upon the instant facts, as criminal
liability does not have the capacity to compensate the plaintiff in the way
that civil liability can and in the way that tort law in the United States not
only allows, but promotes.204 In sum, information considered pursuant to
this factor could weigh in favor of satisfying the touch and concern test if
a court concludes that denial of ATS jurisdiction would result in the
United States harboring a human rights violator.
F.

Any Other American National Interest That Supports
Recognition of ATS Jurisdiction

By stating that protection of “an important American national
interest”205 might warrant recognition of ATS jurisdiction, Justice Breyer
seemed to offer flexibility to courts confronted with the question of ATS
jurisdiction but not the facts that would otherwise support this
jurisdiction, such as domestic conduct or the defendant’s U.S. nationality.
This Article agrees that courts should consider the national interest for
the purpose of judicial flexibility, but expressly proposes that in the
exercise of this flexibility, courts contemplate the propriety of ATS
jurisdiction as a vehicle for “defin[ing] and prescrib[ing] punishment for
certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal
concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft,
genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism”206 without
regard to the requirements of territorial or nationality jurisdiction.207

201. § 1350 note.
202. See generally Bradley, supra note 4.
203. Several courts have concluded that some ATS claims, for example, genocide, war crimes,
forced labor, aircraft hijacking, do not require state action. See generally Am. Soc’y of Int’l Law,
supra note 200.
204. See Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts 2 (2000) (“Tort law is primarily intended to redress
legally recognized harms by rendering a judgment against the wrongdoer. This award is usually a
money award called ‘damages,’ and it is usually intended as a kind of compensation for the harm
suffered.”).
205. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1671 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring).
206. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 404 (1987).
207. See Wuerth, supra note 12, at 618. This factor would allow courts to find ATS jurisdiction
even where no relevant conduct, per se, occurred on U.S. soil (and the defendant is not a U.S.
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Pursuant to its potential accommodation of universal jurisdiction,
this factor might also provide the victims of universally condemned acts
with their only possible remedy. Because many of these victims
ultimately gain political asylum in the United States, proper application
of this factor may require that courts more carefully weigh whether the
claims are entitled to ATS jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court, in fact, seems willing to treat plaintiffs and
defendants differently, for ATS purposes, even when both first develop a
connection with the United States after the occurrence of the events that
gave rise to the tort. In Kiobel, the Court stated: “Following the alleged
atrocities, petitioners moved to the United States where they have been
granted political asylum and now reside as legal residents.”208 Despite
acknowledging this very significant contact with the United States and
the reason for granting asylum, the Court made no issue of it when
evaluating whether plaintiffs’ claims sufficiently touched and concerned
the United States. In his concurrence, Justice Breyer treated these facts
no differently, opining that “the parties and relevant conduct lack
sufficient ties to the United States for the ATS to provide jurisdiction.”209
Conversely, in Kiobel, the Court approved the exercise of ATS
jurisdiction in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala210 and In re Estate of Marcos
Human Rights Litigation,211 suggesting that because, in each case, the
defendant had moved to the United States after the occurrence of the
tort in question and the allegations against them were of heinous acts,
the United States had an interest in not providing a safe haven for
them.212
This disparate treatment is somewhat curious given that a plaintiff
who has received asylum in the United States after a tortious event in
their country—and perhaps because of the tortious event—cannot mount
a claim against the defendant in their home country. While these facts
would not transform a case with no “relevant conduct” in the United
States into its opposite, they might warrant a finding of subject matter
jurisdiction given the legal relationship between the plaintiff and the
United States and the larger goal of furthering the American national
interest of providing a victim of an act that is universally condemned with
access to a remedy.213 This factor would allow a court to consider

national). Pursuant to this factor, the location of the relevant conduct, in other words, might be
inconsequential to the question of ATS jurisdiction.
208. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663.
209. Id. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring).
210. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
211. In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1468 (9th Cir. 1994).
212. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1675 (Breyer, J., concurring).
213. See McCorquodale, supra note 56, at 846 (noting that the Guiding Principles require states to
provide access to remedy “especially where claimants ‘cannot access [their] home State courts
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allegations, perhaps not theretofore considered, to determine whether a
significant American national interest could be advanced by the exercise
of ATS jurisdiction.

III. Interaction with MORRISON
In
the Supreme Court held that the presumption against
extraterritoriality applied to federal statutes.215 As a consequence,
federal statutes apply only to domestic conduct unless they contain clear
evidence otherwise.216 However, courts answering the question of a
statute’s extraterritorial application should determine whether the
conduct or relationship that was the focus of the statute occurred in the
United States. If it did, this would suffice to displace the presumption.217
If these conclusions provided the sole guidance for the ATS plaintiff with
claims containing material foreign features, that plaintiff might have a
limited chance of recovery. In Kiobel, however, the Court seemed to
relax the restriction of the presumption against extraterritoriality by
suggesting, if not outright creating, the touch and concern test, thus
allowing plaintiffs to displace the presumption if the claims contain
allegations sufficiently tied to the United States. This potentially enables
plaintiffs to litigate ATS claims with more significant foreign attributes.
The proposed test provides a mechanism, pursuant to the relative
license granted by Kiobel, through which courts can find jurisdiction
under the ATS, despite the potential limitations imposed in Morrison.
The test generally aligns with Morrison in its effort to determine whether
the domestic conduct or relationship at issue is the focus of the statute.218
It also operates more broadly to consider whether the instant claim
connects, in some other material way, to the statute’s focus.219 As noted

Morrison214

regardless of the merits of the claim” (alteration in original) (quoting U.N. Human Rights Council,
supra note 32)).
214. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
215. Id. at 254–56. The Court also explained that the question of the presumption’s applicability
goes to the merits of the case and not jurisdiction. See id. at 254 (“[T]o ask what conduct [a statute]
reaches is to ask what conduct [a statute] prohibits, which is a merits questions. Subject matter
jurisdiction, by contrast, ‘refers to a tribunal’s’ ‘power to hear a case.’”). The notion of applying the
presumption against extraterritoriality to a jurisdictional statute like the ATS has been disquieting,
post-Kiobel, to say the least. See Anthony J. Colangelo, Kiobel: Muddling the Distinction Between
Prescriptive and Adjudicative Jurisdiction, 28 Md. J. Int’l L. 65, 66 (2013); Hafetz, supra note 18, at
110–11; Steinhardt, supra note 8, at 841–42.
216. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255.
217. Id. at 266.
218. Justice Alito emphasized the importance of this standard in Kiobel, noting that “only conduct
that satisfies Sosa’s requirements of definiteness and acceptance among civilized nations can be said to
have been ‘the focus of congressional concern,’ when Congress enacted the ATS.” Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1670 (2013) (Alito, J., concurring).
219. Before discussing the importance of statutory focus to the question of displacing the
presumption against extraterritoriality, the Supreme Court, in Morrison, first rejected the “conduct
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above, for a plaintiff to satisfy the first factor of the proposed test, the
plaintiff must allege that the entire law of nations violation occurred in
the United States. As law of nations violations “are the objects of the
[ATS’s] solicitude,”220 the alleged occurrence of this event in the United
States would be the most domestic activity that the statute contemplates
and thus, would align with Morrison. However, if a plaintiff cannot
satisfy this factor (because the alleged law of nations violation occurred
abroad) that would not, under the proposed test, doom the plaintiff’s
claim, as Kiobel allows for a consideration of the full contours of the
plaintiff’s claim and not simply the location of specific conduct.221
Factor two of the proposed test considers whether “other relevant
conduct” allegedly occurred in the United States, such that the
presumption against extraterritoriality might be displaced. This factor
also seeks to ascertain the existence of any domestic activity concerning
the alleged law of nations violation—the focus of the ATS—and
therefore also allies with Morrison. As with the first factor, however,
should a plaintiff be unable to satisfy this factor, the plaintiff could seek
to ground ATS jurisdiction pursuant to another factor or set of factors.
Factor three concerns the defendant’s nationality and would support
the displacement of the presumption against the extraterritorial
application of the ATS if the defendant were a U.S. national. This factor
aligns with Morrison because the focus of the ATS is to provide U.S.
courts with jurisdiction over “aliens” who allege torts in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States. To do so, the statute must

and effects” test of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, itself crafted to determine the
extraterritorial application of a statute, § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. The test
considered: (1) “whether the wrongful conduct occurred in the United States”; and (2) “whether the
wrongful conduct had a substantial effect in the United States or upon United States citizens.”
Morrison, 561 U.S. at 257. In rebuffing the test, the Court reasoned that nothing in the statute
suggested or supported its use; the test was difficult to administer; and the test did not yield
predictable results. Id. at 258–59 (citing SEC v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 19–93 (2d Cir. 2003)). The Court
held that the focus of § 10b of the Securities and Exchange Act is not “deceptive conduct” generally
but rather “deceptive conduct ‘in connection with the purchase or sale of [securities].’” Id. at 266–67
(emphasis added) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1934)) (citing SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 820
(2002)). Accordingly, for the presumption to be displaced the domestic conduct in question must
concern “deceptive conduct ‘in connection with the purchase or sale of [securities].’” Id. at 266. While
at first glance it might appear that the proposed factors test is the conduct and effects test by another
name, it is not. The proposed test does not focus on U.S. “effects” of foreign conduct. Although this
would seem to be a worthy goal and one that is consistent with international norms, it is, instead, more
concerned with the location and the materiality of the conduct itself, the nationality of the defendant,
and policy considerations for courts, preoccupations that reconcile with international jurisdictional
norms. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 403(2)(a) (1987); see also supra pp. 467–68.
The test is concerned with the effect of a denial of ATS jurisdiction if that denial could reasonably
result in the United States harboring a human rights violator or denying a human rights abuse victim
access to a remedy. These are not the types of effects that the Supreme Court renounced in Morrison.
220. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 267.
221. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
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necessarily contemplate a defendant against whom the claim is to be
brought, certainly including the defendant U.S. national. This factor does
not perfectly align with Morrison because there the Court was unmoved
by the U.S. nationality of some of the defendants and because it
contemplates a foreign defendant. Nonetheless, it aligns with the goal of
determining whether the ATS claim touches and concerns the United
States.
Factor four concerns the demands of international comity and
relates to the ATS’s focus because courts can use the concept as a basis
for recognizing the cause of action brought pursuant to the ATS, thereby
vindicating the statute’s purpose.222 Moreover, a federal court’s power to
act based upon international comity demands exists outside of—and
perhaps even above—the concerns raised in Morrison, as it emanates
from courts’ discretionary powers.223 As a result, it likely cannot, as an
existential matter, conflict with the ATS’s focus.
Factor five concerns safe harbor from liability and assumes the
sufficiency of the underlying allegations—for example, an “alien” and a
tort in violation of the law of nations, but also some jurisdictional defect,
such as the foreign-cubedness of the claims. It concerns the focus of the
ATS by prompting courts to question whether they may exercise
jurisdiction in service of the larger goal of preventing the harboring of a
human rights violator. It does not concern underlying domestic conduct.
However, if U.S. courts are to seriously consider safe harbor concerns in
ATS cases, limiting that consideration to only those cases where there is
underlying domestic conduct that is the focus of the statute, as required
by Morrison, would blunt the success of the undertaking from the start.
Perhaps Kiobel would permit courts to consider safe harbor issues more
expansively.
Factor six is a catch all and, like most such factors, deliberately
vague; it exists solely to allow courts to realize the goal of the ATS
(barring a legitimate opportunity to do so based upon one or more of the
other factors). This catch all factor would allow courts, where
appropriate, to exercise jurisdiction over cases in which “aliens” are
complaining of a tort in violation of the law of nations, the express focus
of the ATS. The proposed test engages Morrison’s preoccupation with
domestic conduct and extends it to the limit allowed by Kiobel, in pursuit
of the larger goal of determining whether an ATS claim touches and

222. See supra pp. 474–75.
223. See also Voigt v. Fabricut, Inc., No. 10-CV-662-TCK-TLW, 2012 WL 1190660, at *3 (N.D.
Okla. Apr. 6, 2012) (observing that “[t]he international comity argument is premised on the Court’s
discretionary power to abstain from infringing on a foreign proceeding”); In re Regus Bus. Ctr. Corp.,
301 B.R. 122, 129 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting the court’s “inherent and discretionary power” to
abstain from resolving an issue because of international comity amongst other concerns).
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concerns the United States so as to displace the presumption against
extraterritoriality.

Conclusion
Currently, the touch and concern test, as presented by the Supreme
Court in Kiobel, offers little guidance for determining when the
presumption against the extraterritorial application of the ATS might be
displaced. This Article attempts to provide some direction by divining
balancing factors based upon the Kiobel opinions and international
jurisdictional norms. The proposed test operates within the lines drawn
by the Supreme Court in Morrison and Kiobel together and seeks to
appeal to the extant and growing international concern about providing
access to a remedy for alleged corporate human rights abuse victims.
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